Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund

IF 0.4 Q3 LAW Connecticut Insurance Law Journal Pub Date : 2010-09-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.1636456
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher Muller
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引用次数: 36

Abstract

The inherent tensions in the financial sector mean that episodes of extreme stress are inevitable, if unpredictable. This is so even if the regulatory and supervisory regimes are in many respects effective. The capacity of government to intervene may determine whether the distress is confined to the financial sector or breaks out into the real economy. Although adequate resolution authority to address a failing financial firm is a necessary objective of the current regulatory reform, a firm-by-firm approach will be unable to address a major systemic failure such as the Financial Crisis of 2007-08, which may require capital support of the financial sector to avoid severe economic harm. We therefore propose the creation of a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund ("the Fund") ("SEIF"), scaled appropriately to the size of the US economy, $1 trillion. The facility should be funded (and partially pre-funded) by risk-adjusted assessments on all large financial firms, including hedge funds, that benefit from systemic stability. The Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") would administer the Fund, use of which would be triggered by a “triple key” concurrence among Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), and the Federal Reserve ("Fed"). Unlike a taxpayer “bailout,” such a fund would mutualize systemic risk among financial firms through a facility overseen by the regulators. The funding mechanism will give financial firms new incentives to warn regulators of growing systemic risk. Such standby emergency authority avoids the need for high stakes legislative action mid-crisis, which can be destabilizing even if successful and catastrophic if not. Such an approach is superior to the financial sector nationalization strategy that is found in the newly enacted Dodd-Frank financial regulatory reform.
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直面金融危机:多德-弗兰克法案的危险和建立系统性紧急保险基金的理由
金融领域固有的紧张局势意味着,极端压力的发作即使不可预测,也是不可避免的。即使监管和监督制度在许多方面是有效的,情况也是如此。政府干预的能力可能决定危机是局限于金融部门,还是会蔓延到实体经济。尽管足够的决议授权来解决倒闭的金融公司是当前监管改革的必要目标,但逐个公司的方法将无法解决重大的系统性故障,如2007-08年的金融危机,这可能需要金融部门的资本支持,以避免严重的经济损害。因此,我们建议建立一个系统性紧急保险基金(“基金”)(“SEIF”),适当地按美国经济规模(1万亿美元)进行调整。该安排的资金(以及部分预先资金)应来自对所有受益于系统稳定的大型金融公司(包括对冲基金)进行的风险调整评估。财政部(“财政部”)将管理该基金,该基金的使用将由财政部、联邦存款保险公司(“FDIC”)和美联储(“Fed”)之间的“三键”一致触发。与纳税人的“救助”不同,这样的基金将通过一个由监管机构监督的设施来分担金融公司之间的系统性风险。这一融资机制将给金融公司新的激励,促使它们向监管机构警告日益增长的系统性风险。这种备用紧急权力避免了在危机中采取高风险立法行动的需要,这种行动即使成功也可能造成不稳定,如果失败则会造成灾难性后果。这种方法优于新颁布的多德-弗兰克金融监管改革中的金融部门国有化战略。
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