{"title":"Company Stock and Retirement Plan Diversification","authors":"O. Mitchell, Stephen Utkus","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.304461","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the risks and benefits of holding company stock in employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) retirement plans. We address three questions: (1) What is the role and function of company stock in such plans? (2) Who might be affected by enhanced portfolio diversification in such plans? and (3) What mechanisms exist, or might be developed, to enhance portfolio diversification if more diversification were deemed useful? Firms offer company stock within DC plans in an effort to enhance economic performance, though evidence is mixed on productivity gains from stock ownership. We demonstrate that concentrated stock positions arise most often in larger firms' DC plans where sponsors direct employer contributions and restrict diversification. Stock concentration also arises because participants systematically underestimate the risk of employer stock and over-rely on its past performance in making investment decisions. In a retirement system with concentrated stock positions, there will always be some participants who forfeit DC plan savings to firm bankruptcy. Encouraging plan diversification mitigates this risk, but it could also induce some companies to redirect plan contributions to other forms of stock compensation or to replace stock contributions with cash compensation. We conclude by describing policy tools that might be used to encourage diversification and discuss conditions for their effective implementation.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"64","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.304461","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 64

Abstract

This paper explores the risks and benefits of holding company stock in employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) retirement plans. We address three questions: (1) What is the role and function of company stock in such plans? (2) Who might be affected by enhanced portfolio diversification in such plans? and (3) What mechanisms exist, or might be developed, to enhance portfolio diversification if more diversification were deemed useful? Firms offer company stock within DC plans in an effort to enhance economic performance, though evidence is mixed on productivity gains from stock ownership. We demonstrate that concentrated stock positions arise most often in larger firms' DC plans where sponsors direct employer contributions and restrict diversification. Stock concentration also arises because participants systematically underestimate the risk of employer stock and over-rely on its past performance in making investment decisions. In a retirement system with concentrated stock positions, there will always be some participants who forfeit DC plan savings to firm bankruptcy. Encouraging plan diversification mitigates this risk, but it could also induce some companies to redirect plan contributions to other forms of stock compensation or to replace stock contributions with cash compensation. We conclude by describing policy tools that might be used to encourage diversification and discuss conditions for their effective implementation.
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公司股票和退休计划多元化
本文探讨了在雇主发起的固定缴款(DC)退休计划中持有公司股票的风险和收益。我们解决了三个问题:(1)公司股票在这些计划中的作用和功能是什么?(2)在这些计划中,增强投资组合多样化可能会对哪些人产生影响?(3)如果更多的分散投资被认为是有用的,现有或可能开发哪些机制来增强投资组合的多样化?公司在固定缴款计划中提供公司股票是为了提高经济表现,尽管有关股票持有对生产率的提高的证据好坏参半。我们证明,集中的股票头寸最常出现在大型公司的固定缴款计划中,在这种计划中,发起人直接向雇主缴款,并限制了多元化。股票集中也会出现,因为参与者系统性地低估了雇主股票的风险,在做出投资决策时过度依赖其过去的表现。在一个股票头寸集中的退休制度中,总会有一些参与者放弃固定缴款计划的储蓄,导致公司破产。鼓励计划多样化减轻了这种风险,但它也可能促使一些公司将计划缴款改为其他形式的股票补偿,或以现金补偿取代股票缴款。最后,我们描述了可能用于鼓励多样化的政策工具,并讨论了有效实施这些工具的条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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