Calibrating Legal Judgments

IF 3 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Journal of Legal Analysis Pub Date : 2016-10-19 DOI:10.1093/JLA/LAW010
F. Schauer, Barbara A. Spellman
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Abstract

In ordinary life, people who assess other people’s assessments typically take into account the other judgments of those they are assessing in order to calibrate the judgment they are now assessing. The restaurant and hotel rating website TripAdvisor is exemplary, because it facilitates calibration by providing access to a rater’s previous ratings. This makes it possible to see whether a particular rating is coming from a rater who is enthusiastic about every place she patronizes, or from someone who is incessantly hard to please. And even when less systematized, as with the assessment of a letter of recommendation or a college transcript, calibration by recourse to the decisional history of those whose judgments we are assessing is a ubiquitous feature of ordinary life. Yet despite the ubiquity and utility of such calibration, the legal system seems perversely to reject it. Appellate courts do not openly adjust their standard of review based on the previous judgments of the judge whose decision they are reviewing, nor do judges who review legislative or administrative decisions, magistrates who evaluate search warrant representations, and even jurors who assess witness perception. In most legal domains, calibration by reference to the other decisions of the judgment being reviewed is invisible, either because it does not exist or because what reviewing bodies know informally is not something they are willing to admit to using. Appellate courts do not, at least openly, look more carefully at the decisions of a trial judge whose decisions are often reversed, and administrative law judges do not acknowledge examining the decisions of some administrators more closely because of what they know about the decisional history of that administrator. However common it is for ordinary people to attempt to calibrate the decisions of those on whom they rely, the law generally resists such calibration, implicitly prohibiting access to a reviewee’s decisional history and discouraging publicly acknowledging that a decisional history has played a role in a reviewer’s decision. Assisted by insights from cognitive psychology and philosophy, this Article examines law’s seeming aversion to calibration, and to explore what this aversion says about the nature of law and legal decision-making.
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校正法律判决
在日常生活中,人们在评估他人的评估时,通常会考虑到他们正在评估的人的其他判断,以校准他们正在评估的判断。餐厅和酒店评级网站TripAdvisor就是一个典型的例子,因为它通过提供对评级者以前评级的访问来方便校准。这样就有可能看出某个评价是来自一个对她光顾的每个地方都充满热情的评价者,还是来自一个总是难以取悦的评价者。即使在不那么系统化的情况下,比如评估推荐信或大学成绩单时,通过我们评估其判断的人的决策史来进行校准,也是日常生活中普遍存在的特征。然而,尽管这种校准无处不在且实用,但法律体系似乎固执地拒绝它。上诉法院不会根据正在审查的法官先前的判决公开调整审查标准,审查立法或行政决定的法官、评估搜查令陈述的地方法官、甚至评估证人感知的陪审员也不会。在大多数法律领域,参照被审查判决的其他决定进行校准是不可见的,要么是因为它不存在,要么是因为审查机构非正式地知道的东西不是他们愿意承认使用的东西。上诉法院至少不会公开地更仔细地审查初审法官的判决,而初审法官的判决往往被推翻,行政法法官也不承认会更仔细地审查一些行政官的判决,因为他们对该行政官的决策历史有所了解。然而,对于普通人来说,试图校准他们所依赖的人的决定是很常见的,法律通常抵制这种校准,隐含地禁止访问审稿人的决策历史,并且不鼓励公开承认决策历史在审稿人的决策中发挥了作用。在认知心理学和哲学见解的帮助下,本文考察了法律对校准的表面厌恶,并探讨了这种厌恶对法律本质和法律决策的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
审稿时长
16 weeks
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