Regulation of DeFi Lending

Sea-hoon Kwon
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Abstract

The rise of intermediary-less decentralized finance (“DeFi”) lending has led many to wonder how it should be regulated. Although DeFi lending could potentially offer reduced risks of centralization and market frictions, investors in DeFi lending are currently exposed to centralized risks and losses in the volatile market in the absence of regulation. The SEC suggested that the agency might regulate the sector under the federal securities laws. A truly decentralized lending project, however, does not involve any centralized entity that could carry the burden of compliance with the securities laws. This Note shows that many DeFi lending projects are not truly decentralized and are in various stages of decentralization. Unlike P2P lenders and financial intermediaries that bear the costs of compliance, many DeFi developers seek to build automated lending systems and gradually relinquish their control over their creation. However, with the lack of regulation, the investors have no means to tell actors who seek to build secure decentralized systems from those who do not in the early stage of DeFi protocol development. To address the issue, this Note proposes a three-part framework that would oversee the process of decentralization for DeFi lending projects, drawing its structure from the U.S. banking regulation focused on supervision. First, the framework recognizes the value of decentralization in reducing market frictions and risks of centralization. Second, the framework establishes a federal agency that oversees the process of decentralization on the flexible safety and soundness standard of Glass-Steagall Act. Third, the framework grants enforcement powers to the federal agency to sanction DeFi platforms that do not comply with government regulations.
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DeFi贷款的监管
无中介去中心化金融(“DeFi”)贷款的兴起让许多人想知道应该如何监管它。尽管DeFi贷款可能会降低集中化和市场摩擦的风险,但在缺乏监管的动荡市场中,DeFi贷款的投资者目前面临集中风险和损失。美国证券交易委员会建议,该机构可能会根据联邦证券法对该行业进行监管。然而,一个真正去中心化的贷款项目不涉及任何可能承担遵守证券法负担的中心化实体。本说明显示,许多DeFi贷款项目并不是真正的去中心化,而是处于去中心化的不同阶段。与承担合规成本的P2P贷款机构和金融中介机构不同,许多DeFi开发商寻求建立自动化贷款系统,并逐渐放弃对其创建的控制权。然而,由于缺乏监管,投资者无法在DeFi协议开发的早期阶段区分那些寻求建立安全分散系统的参与者和那些不这样做的参与者。为了解决这个问题,本报告提出了一个由三部分组成的框架,该框架将监督DeFi贷款项目的去中心化过程,其结构借鉴了以监管为重点的美国银行业监管。首先,该框架认识到权力下放在减少市场摩擦和中央集权风险方面的价值。第二,该框架建立了一个联邦机构,监督格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案灵活的安全和健全标准的权力下放过程。第三,该框架授予联邦机构执法权力,以制裁不符合政府法规的DeFi平台。
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