Pricing Decisions with Social Interactions: A Game-Theoretic Model

IF 2.5 4区 管理学 Q3 MANAGEMENT Decision Analysis Pub Date : 2022-11-23 DOI:10.1287/deca.2022.0463
Xiaofang Wang, Yaoyao Yang, Jun Zhuang
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

For media or digital products with quality uncertainty like online games, movies, theater plays, software, and smartphone applications, online customers may strategically delay their purchase waiting for online reviews and their peers’ purchase decisions. Thus, a firm needs to consider both social learning and positive network externality to anticipate the customers’ purchasing decisions and set a good pricing strategy over time. This paper investigates how these dual concerns affect the strategic interaction between a firm using preannounced pricing or responsive pricing and strategic customers in a two-period game-theoretic model. Deviating from conventional wisdom suggesting that social learning and externality work in a similar way, our results highlight their differences and provide valuable managerial insights. Although social learning and externality play a similar role in expanding the increasing-price-optimal region, they are different in other aspects: The firm will be worse off with learning if the externality gets stronger, whereas it will be worse off or better off with learning if learning gets stronger. In addition, we characterize the condition under which responsive pricing may outperform preannounced pricing. We further find that the firm’s discount factor has an influence on the firm’s pricing strategy selection. Funding: X. Wang and Y. Yang acknowledge financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72071204]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2022.0463 .
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基于社会互动的定价决策:一个博弈论模型
对于质量不确定的媒体或数字产品,如网络游戏、电影、戏剧、软件和智能手机应用程序,在线客户可能会策略性地推迟购买,等待在线评论和同伴的购买决定。因此,企业需要考虑社会学习和积极的网络外部性,以预测客户的购买决策,并随着时间的推移制定良好的定价策略。本文在一个两期博弈论模型中研究了这些双重关注如何影响使用预先宣布定价或响应式定价的企业与战略客户之间的战略互动。传统观点认为社会学习和外部性以相似的方式起作用,我们的研究结果突出了它们的差异,并提供了有价值的管理见解。尽管社会学习和外部性在扩大价格增长最优区域方面发挥了相似的作用,但它们在其他方面却有所不同:外部性越强,企业的学习状况就越差;而学习性越强,企业的学习状况就越差或越好。此外,我们描述了响应式定价可能优于预先宣布定价的条件。我们进一步发现,企业的折扣因子对企业的定价策略选择有影响。基金资助:王欣、杨宇感谢国家自然科学基金资助[基金号:72071204]。补充材料:在线附录可在https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2022.0463上获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Decision Analysis
Decision Analysis MANAGEMENT-
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
21.10%
发文量
19
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