Competitive Processes and the Evolution of Governance Structures

Abstract

Cet article examine la concurrence entre des structures de gouvernance des entreprises. Il y est souligne quune panoplie de structures constitutionnelles peut etre observee dans le cadre marchand et que cette variete a servi des objectifs transactionnels importants sur un plan historique. Larticle met en contraste les approches coasienne et autrichienne de lexplication des structures de gouvernance. Nous examinons la tendance recente du deplacement de la propriete des entreprises vers les investisseurs par opposition aux arrangements cooperatifs et mutuels. L a r gument a t ion sout i ent que lintervention etatique peut etre une explication importante des tendances recentes au Royaume Uni, notamment dans le domaine des institutions financieres. Les suggestions selon lesquelles des modeles de gouvernance des entreprises par les partenaires devraient etre introduits a travers lintervention de lEtat ignorent a la fois les couts de transaction et limportance dassurer laffectation du talent entrepreneurial en direction des ressources economiques.This paper considers competition between governance arrangements for firms. It is argued that a variety of constitutional structures can be observed in the market and that historically this variety has served important transactional purposes. The Coasian and Austrian approaches to the explanation of governance arrangements are contrasted. Recent trends towards investor ownership of firms and away from co-operative and mutual arrangements are considered. It is argued that government regulatory intervention may be an important explanation for recent trends in the UK, especially in the area of financial institutions. Suggestions that stakeholder models of firm governance should be introduced through state intervention ignore considerations both of transactions costs and the importance of ensuring the allocation of entrepreneurial talent to the direction of economic resources.