Optimal Sourcing with Ambiguously Correlated Suppliers

Ming Zhao, Nickolas K. Freeman
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We present a comprehensive study for the optimal sourcing strategy of a firm where the market selling price is endogenously determined by the total output and suppliers face correlated disruptions that are difficult to estimate. We develop a distributionally robust (DR) model for a single group of correlated suppliers that maximizes the firms' expected profit under the worst-case disruption distribution. Our model only requires the marginal disruption probabilities and accommodates both yield and capacity uncertainty. We derive simple expressions that allow the firm to eliminate less reliable suppliers on the combined basis of cost and reliability when yield is uncertain. In the case capacity uncertainty, we show the cheapest supplier influences the orders placed with more reliable suppliers, if the cheapest supplier receives no order. We incorporate the DR model in a more general model where the available suppliers are grouped based on common sources of vulnerability. This model accommodates cases where correlations exist between all or no suppliers as special cases. The model allows decision-makers to tailor the sourcing strategy based on their risk tolerance. We introduce new measures for supplier efficiency that accounts for both supplier costs and reliabilities. These measures are incorporated in a solution procedure that provides the optimal supplier selection and order allocation. The measure of efficiency serves as an extension of the commonly cited insight that "cost is an order qualifier and reliability is an order winner" for the case of correlated suppliers. We end the paper by studying the impact of buyer competition on the optimal sourcing strategy. We present equilibrium solutions for cases of symmetric information and study the information sharing behavior of a better-informed firm under information asymmetry.
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模糊关联供应商的最优采购
本文对市场销售价格由总产出内生决定且供应商面临难以估计的相关中断的企业的最优采购策略进行了全面研究。在最坏情况下,我们建立了一组相关供应商的分布鲁棒性(DR)模型,使公司的期望利润最大化。我们的模型只需要边际中断概率,并且同时考虑了产量和产能的不确定性。我们推导出简单的表达式,当产量不确定时,允许企业在成本和可靠性的综合基础上淘汰不可靠的供应商。在产能不确定的情况下,如果最便宜的供应商没有收到订单,则最便宜的供应商会影响更可靠的供应商的订单。我们将DR模型合并到一个更通用的模型中,在这个模型中,根据常见的漏洞来源对可用的供应商进行分组。该模型将所有供应商之间存在相关性或不存在相关性的情况作为特殊情况处理。该模型允许决策者根据他们的风险承受能力定制采购策略。我们引入了考虑供应商成本和可靠性的供应商效率的新措施。这些措施被纳入解决方案程序,提供最佳的供应商选择和订单分配。对于相关供应商而言,效率的度量是“成本是订单限定词,可靠性是订单赢家”这一常被引用的观点的延伸。最后,我们研究了买家竞争对最优采购策略的影响。给出了信息对称情况下的均衡解,并研究了信息不对称条件下信息较好的企业的信息共享行为。
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