Bank competition and the design of syndicated loans

IF 2.6 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE FINANCIAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2023-07-06 DOI:10.1111/fire.12359
Chongyang Chen, Robert Kieschnick
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Abstract

We study the effect of bank competition on the design of syndicate loans. We find that competition in the lead lender's market plays a significant role in determining the terms of the syndicate loans. Specifically, higher concentration leads to higher yield spreads, larger issues, shorter maturities, greater contract intensity, and more collateral requirements, but with a greater likelihood of performance pricing. We also find the prior banking relationships, anti-takeover provisions and whether the lead bank is a national, regional, or state bank influence the designs of these loans.

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银行竞争与银团贷款的设计
我们研究了银行竞争对银团贷款设计的影响。我们发现,主要贷款人市场的竞争在决定银团贷款条款方面发挥着重要作用。具体来说,集中度越高,收益率利差越大,发行量越大,期限越短,合同强度越大,抵押要求越多,但业绩定价的可能性也越大。我们还发现,先前的银行关系、反收购条款以及牵头银行是全国性银行、地区性银行还是州银行都会影响这些贷款的设计。
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来源期刊
FINANCIAL REVIEW
FINANCIAL REVIEW BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
28.10%
发文量
39
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