Shifting Legal Sands: Growing Pressure on Early Cooperation, Settlement and Waiver in SEC Enforcement Actions

Carl B. Wilkerson
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Abstract

Public companies face new and aggressive SEC enforcement practices in response to profound patterns of corporate fraud, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and enlarged compliance expectations under revised Federals Sentencing Guidelines. In a determined enforcement agenda, the SEC brought more than 1,300 civil cases and has obtained orders for disgorgement and penalties in excess of $5 billion between 2004 and 2005.During the same time period, the SEC sued approximately 100 chief executive officers of public companies and the Department of Justice has initiated criminal cases alleging securities related misconduct by more than 500 defendants. The wide scope of these actions marks a new world of expected corporate conduct that demands careful attention of management and counsel.In its charging and sanctioning decisions, as well as decisions not to charge and not to sanction, the SEC explicitly recognizes efforts by companies to police themselves, report problems to the government and establish a solid culture of compliance. The SEC specifically targeted the "hearts and minds of senior executives" with penalties of $750 million against WorldCom, $250 million against Qwest, $100 million against Bristol-Myers Squibb or $100 million against Alliance Capital as "serious, real-world consequences."Through its new enforcement regime, the SEC has radically reshaped the rewards and consequences for prompt and cooperative action by companies discovering misconduct or facing enforcement actions. This paper will identify different elements of the SEC’s new expectations and practices through significant cases and SEC statements.
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转移法律沙:在美国证券交易委员会执法行动中,早期合作、和解和豁免的压力越来越大
为了应对企业欺诈的深刻模式、《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)以及修订后的《联邦量刑指南》(Federals Sentencing Guidelines)下加大的合规预期,上市公司面临着新的、激进的证交会执法实践。在坚定的执法议程中,SEC提起了1,300多起民事诉讼,并在2004年至2005年期间获得了超过50亿美元的追缴令和罚款。在同一时期,美国证券交易委员会起诉了大约100名上市公司的首席执行官,美国司法部也对500多名被告提起了与证券相关的不当行为的刑事诉讼。这些行动的范围之广,标志着预期企业行为的新世界,需要管理层和法律顾问的仔细关注。在其指控和制裁决定,以及不指控和不制裁的决定中,美国证券交易委员会明确承认公司在自我监督、向政府报告问题和建立坚实的合规文化方面所做的努力。SEC特别针对“高管的心灵”,对WorldCom处以7.5亿美元罚款,对Qwest处以2.5亿美元罚款,对百时美施贵宝(Bristol-Myers Squibb)处以1亿美元罚款,对Alliance Capital处以1亿美元罚款,称这是“严重的现实后果”。通过新的执法机制,SEC从根本上改变了发现不当行为或面临执法行动的公司迅速采取合作行动的奖励和后果。本文将通过重大案例和SEC声明确定SEC新期望和实践的不同要素。
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