Corporate Governance Oversight and Proxy Advisory Firms

Ike Brannon, Jared Whitley
{"title":"Corporate Governance Oversight and Proxy Advisory Firms","authors":"Ike Brannon, Jared Whitley","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3224511","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Securities and Exchange Commission requires that investment management funds submit proxy votes for all companies in which they own shares. Due to the vast number of stocks held by the typical institutional investor, hedge fund, or mutual fund, most of these investors draw on the research of a proxy advisory firm, which provides them a modicum of guidance in their task and allows them to focus on managing their portfolio. But while their clients want to maximize returns for their investors, the objectives of proxy advisory firms may not be completely aligned. The opacity with which they operate makes it difficult for investment management companies – and indeed individual shareholders – to discern the truth. Proxies have become increasingly contentious in recent years as political activists have leveraged shareholder proposals, determined to pursue their political goals in a variety of ways that circumvent legislation or regulatory activities. Proxy advisors, in turn, have themselves become more political in their support of these shareholder proposals. Accordingly, these activities have been receiving closer scrutiny – especially from Congress, which is currently debating legislation to increase transparency at proxy advisory firms. The SEC has also declared its concern with political activism in proxy voting and may pursue further action in this area as well.","PeriodicalId":10000,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","volume":"126 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Securities Regulation (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3224511","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The Securities and Exchange Commission requires that investment management funds submit proxy votes for all companies in which they own shares. Due to the vast number of stocks held by the typical institutional investor, hedge fund, or mutual fund, most of these investors draw on the research of a proxy advisory firm, which provides them a modicum of guidance in their task and allows them to focus on managing their portfolio. But while their clients want to maximize returns for their investors, the objectives of proxy advisory firms may not be completely aligned. The opacity with which they operate makes it difficult for investment management companies – and indeed individual shareholders – to discern the truth. Proxies have become increasingly contentious in recent years as political activists have leveraged shareholder proposals, determined to pursue their political goals in a variety of ways that circumvent legislation or regulatory activities. Proxy advisors, in turn, have themselves become more political in their support of these shareholder proposals. Accordingly, these activities have been receiving closer scrutiny – especially from Congress, which is currently debating legislation to increase transparency at proxy advisory firms. The SEC has also declared its concern with political activism in proxy voting and may pursue further action in this area as well.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
公司治理监督和代理咨询公司
美国证券交易委员会(sec)要求投资管理基金对其持有股份的所有公司提交代理投票。由于典型的机构投资者、对冲基金或共同基金持有大量股票,这些投资者中的大多数都利用代理咨询公司的研究,这为他们的任务提供了一点点指导,使他们能够专注于管理他们的投资组合。但是,虽然他们的客户希望为投资者带来最大回报,但代理咨询公司的目标可能并不完全一致。它们运作的不透明性,使得投资管理公司——实际上是个人股东——难以辨别真相。近年来,随着政治活动人士利用股东提案,决心以各种规避立法或监管活动的方式实现自己的政治目标,代理权变得越来越有争议。反过来,代理顾问在支持这些股东提案时,本身也变得更加政治化。因此,这些活动受到了更密切的审查——尤其是来自国会的审查,国会目前正在就提高代理咨询公司透明度的立法进行辩论。美国证券交易委员会还宣布了对代理投票中的政治激进主义的担忧,并可能在这一领域采取进一步行动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Misaligned Incentives in Markets: Envisioning Finance That Benefits All of Society Enforcement Against the Biggest Banks Perspectives on U.S. Financial Regulation Transatlantic Extraterritoriality and the Regulation of Derivatives: The Need for an Integrated Approach between Washington and Brussels, the Uncertainties of BREXIT and New Directions in the US Corporate Governance Oversight and Proxy Advisory Firms
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1