{"title":"NATO enlargement after the first round","authors":"F. Larrabee","doi":"10.1080/03932729908456865","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"At the Washington Summit in April, NATO will formally admit three new members: Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Together with the future enlargement of the European Union, the integration of these three countries into NATO will significantly diminish the prospect that Central Europe will again become a source of international tension and geopolitical rivalry. It will also resolve Germany’s historical security dilemma. Rather than being the most exposed edge of the Western security community, Germany will now be surrounded by a group of democratic, peaceful allies. However, the entry of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into NATO does not end the process of enlargement. At the Madrid Summit, the Alliance agreed to maintain an “open door” to new members. Several countries – Slovenia, Romania, and the Baltic states – were singled out as potential candidates, though no explicit guarantee of membership or timetable was given. This raises a number of new policy dilemmas for NATO. How should the enlargement issue be handled at the Washington Summit? If NATO does not issue invitations to any new members at the Washington Summit, how can the credibility of its “open door” policy be maintained? Who should be invited to join in the second round and when should it take place? What will be the impact of any further enlargement on relations with Russia and Ukraine? What effect will further enlargement have on NATO’s cohesion and military effectiveness? Finally, and most importantly, how does enlargement contribute to NATO’s overall transformation and new missions? This question needs to be addressed","PeriodicalId":46246,"journal":{"name":"International Spectator","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"1999-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"28","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Spectator","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729908456865","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
Abstract
At the Washington Summit in April, NATO will formally admit three new members: Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Together with the future enlargement of the European Union, the integration of these three countries into NATO will significantly diminish the prospect that Central Europe will again become a source of international tension and geopolitical rivalry. It will also resolve Germany’s historical security dilemma. Rather than being the most exposed edge of the Western security community, Germany will now be surrounded by a group of democratic, peaceful allies. However, the entry of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into NATO does not end the process of enlargement. At the Madrid Summit, the Alliance agreed to maintain an “open door” to new members. Several countries – Slovenia, Romania, and the Baltic states – were singled out as potential candidates, though no explicit guarantee of membership or timetable was given. This raises a number of new policy dilemmas for NATO. How should the enlargement issue be handled at the Washington Summit? If NATO does not issue invitations to any new members at the Washington Summit, how can the credibility of its “open door” policy be maintained? Who should be invited to join in the second round and when should it take place? What will be the impact of any further enlargement on relations with Russia and Ukraine? What effect will further enlargement have on NATO’s cohesion and military effectiveness? Finally, and most importantly, how does enlargement contribute to NATO’s overall transformation and new missions? This question needs to be addressed