{"title":"Unconventional Wisdom: The Roberts Court's Proper Support of Judicial Elections","authors":"S. W. Gaylord","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1943642","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom holds that the Roberts Court’s recent First Amendment decisions have created a crisis for the 22 states that use contested elections to select the members of their state judiciaries. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who has become a leading critic of judicial elections since retiring from the Supreme Court, has stated, “[l]eft unaddressed, the perception that justice is for sale will undermine the rule of law that the courts are supposed to uphold.” Accordingly, to preserve the independence and integrity of their judiciaries, critics contend that states should adopt the “Missouri Plan” (or some similar form of merit selection) to take the money, and therefore the “politics,” out of judicial selection. This paper contends that the conventional wisdom is wrong — there is no crisis regarding the independence of state judiciaries, and judicial elections, in conjunction with the Roberts Court’s recent decisions, actually promote the independence, accountability, and quality of state court judges. As a result, states need not — and should not — feel compelled to adopt or retain so-called Missouri Plans. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of Justice O’Connor and others, these “merit-based” appointment systems have failed to provide the politics-free judiciary that their advocates promised. In fact, this year 26 states are considering legislation to change or replace their judicial merit selection systems. Thus, this paper concludes that, while there may be no perfect way to select judges, judicial elections ensure that the judiciary remains independent of the other branches of government and that judges remain directly accountable to the people, providing the only meaningful check on the not-so-least dangerous branch.","PeriodicalId":18488,"journal":{"name":"Michigan State international law review","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Michigan State international law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1943642","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that the Roberts Court’s recent First Amendment decisions have created a crisis for the 22 states that use contested elections to select the members of their state judiciaries. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who has become a leading critic of judicial elections since retiring from the Supreme Court, has stated, “[l]eft unaddressed, the perception that justice is for sale will undermine the rule of law that the courts are supposed to uphold.” Accordingly, to preserve the independence and integrity of their judiciaries, critics contend that states should adopt the “Missouri Plan” (or some similar form of merit selection) to take the money, and therefore the “politics,” out of judicial selection. This paper contends that the conventional wisdom is wrong — there is no crisis regarding the independence of state judiciaries, and judicial elections, in conjunction with the Roberts Court’s recent decisions, actually promote the independence, accountability, and quality of state court judges. As a result, states need not — and should not — feel compelled to adopt or retain so-called Missouri Plans. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of Justice O’Connor and others, these “merit-based” appointment systems have failed to provide the politics-free judiciary that their advocates promised. In fact, this year 26 states are considering legislation to change or replace their judicial merit selection systems. Thus, this paper concludes that, while there may be no perfect way to select judges, judicial elections ensure that the judiciary remains independent of the other branches of government and that judges remain directly accountable to the people, providing the only meaningful check on the not-so-least dangerous branch.
传统观点认为,罗伯茨法院最近对第一修正案的裁决给22个州造成了危机,这些州使用竞争性选举来选择州司法机构的成员。正如桑德拉·戴·奥康纳大法官(Sandra Day O 'Connor)所说的那样,她从最高法院退休后成为司法选举的主要批评者,“如果不加以解决,正义被出卖的观念将破坏法院本应维护的法治。”因此,为了保持司法机构的独立性和完整性,批评者主张各州应该采用“密苏里计划”(或类似形式的择优选拔),从司法选拔中剔除金钱,从而剔除“政治”。本文认为,传统观念是错误的——国家司法机构的独立性不存在危机,司法选举与罗伯茨法院最近的判决相结合,实际上促进了州法院法官的独立性、问责制和质量。因此,各州不必——也不应该——感到被迫采用或保留所谓的“密苏里计划”。与奥康纳法官和其他人的传统智慧相反,这些“择优”任命制度未能提供其倡导者所承诺的无政治的司法。事实上,今年有26个州正在考虑立法改变或取代他们的司法选拔制度。因此,本文得出的结论是,虽然可能没有完美的方式来选择法官,但司法选举确保了司法机构独立于政府的其他部门,法官仍然直接对人民负责,为不那么危险的部门提供了唯一有意义的检查。