{"title":"Book Review: Organizing Matters – Two Logics of Trade Union Representation","authors":"Thomas Klikauer, Nadine Campbell","doi":"10.1177/10242589211061068a","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"floods or forest fires have shown the limits of small states. For example, the EU has long since set the course for mobile phone broadcast warning systems for direct notification of those affected, of the kind that have long existed in the USA, China and Japan, and are being introduced in France, Italy and Great Britain, while in Germany there is talk of reintroducing sirens. Streeck ignores the fact that some European course-setting can be helpful, whereas a traditional small state such as Belgium remained at the same level of unpreparedness as Germany in the face of the floods. No one seems properly prepared for regularly recurring fires. His alternative concept of a united but not unified Europe, however, suffers from a lack of institutional anchoring and thus follows a German tradition of building castles in the air. The small states would coexist peacefully and harmoniously, he postulates, so that the question seems justified whether there would be any international relations at all. In parallel, he pleads for a Europe of variable geometry or à la carte (p. 390). It can be assumed from this that the KeynesPolanyi state is incompatible with many building blocks of the EU, such as membership of the monetary union with fixed debt and budget deficit limits, and prohibition of capital controls, internal as well as external. In order to implement the desired changes in the EU, not only would considerably higher transfer sums be necessary, but nothing less than an abolition of the Fiscal Pact, the ‘debt brake’ and the ban on capital controls, together with a revival of industrial policy with the possibility of subsidies, the enforcement of the ‘polluter pays’ principle, an increase in the size of the public sector, and crisis resistance and resilience. In this context, why the editors left in footnotes on dumplings and pasta remains unfathomable. It is not least to Streeck’s credit that he has brought blasphemous questions about the EU back into the culture of rational discourse. In any case, pro-Europeans have to answer a few tricky questions that go to the heart of the matter, including many neoliberal ingredients. Why is it that in the USA a state like California can introduce stricter emissions standards, while in the EU it is impossible for a Member State to do the same? Is the EU therefore more neoliberal than the USA or at least the EU internal market more neoliberal than the US internal market? Why do minimum standards in the EU necessarily have to be maximum standards at the same time? In the USA, the car industry quickly adapted to the Californian standards instead of producing different types of cars in each case; in Europe, no one is allowed to lead the way: can Europe still afford this ideological narrow-mindedness in times of accelerated climate change?","PeriodicalId":23253,"journal":{"name":"Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research","volume":"71 1","pages":"547 - 551"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10242589211061068a","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & LABOR","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
floods or forest fires have shown the limits of small states. For example, the EU has long since set the course for mobile phone broadcast warning systems for direct notification of those affected, of the kind that have long existed in the USA, China and Japan, and are being introduced in France, Italy and Great Britain, while in Germany there is talk of reintroducing sirens. Streeck ignores the fact that some European course-setting can be helpful, whereas a traditional small state such as Belgium remained at the same level of unpreparedness as Germany in the face of the floods. No one seems properly prepared for regularly recurring fires. His alternative concept of a united but not unified Europe, however, suffers from a lack of institutional anchoring and thus follows a German tradition of building castles in the air. The small states would coexist peacefully and harmoniously, he postulates, so that the question seems justified whether there would be any international relations at all. In parallel, he pleads for a Europe of variable geometry or à la carte (p. 390). It can be assumed from this that the KeynesPolanyi state is incompatible with many building blocks of the EU, such as membership of the monetary union with fixed debt and budget deficit limits, and prohibition of capital controls, internal as well as external. In order to implement the desired changes in the EU, not only would considerably higher transfer sums be necessary, but nothing less than an abolition of the Fiscal Pact, the ‘debt brake’ and the ban on capital controls, together with a revival of industrial policy with the possibility of subsidies, the enforcement of the ‘polluter pays’ principle, an increase in the size of the public sector, and crisis resistance and resilience. In this context, why the editors left in footnotes on dumplings and pasta remains unfathomable. It is not least to Streeck’s credit that he has brought blasphemous questions about the EU back into the culture of rational discourse. In any case, pro-Europeans have to answer a few tricky questions that go to the heart of the matter, including many neoliberal ingredients. Why is it that in the USA a state like California can introduce stricter emissions standards, while in the EU it is impossible for a Member State to do the same? Is the EU therefore more neoliberal than the USA or at least the EU internal market more neoliberal than the US internal market? Why do minimum standards in the EU necessarily have to be maximum standards at the same time? In the USA, the car industry quickly adapted to the Californian standards instead of producing different types of cars in each case; in Europe, no one is allowed to lead the way: can Europe still afford this ideological narrow-mindedness in times of accelerated climate change?
洪水或森林火灾显示了小州的局限性。例如,欧盟早就制定了直接通知受影响人群的手机广播警报系统的路线,这种系统早已在美国、中国和日本存在,并正在法国、意大利和英国引入,而在德国,人们正在谈论重新引入警报器。施特雷克忽略了这样一个事实,即一些欧洲的路线设定可能是有帮助的,而像比利时这样的传统小国在面对洪水时仍然处于与德国相同的准备不足的水平。似乎没有人对定期发生的火灾做好充分准备。然而,他的另一种概念——一个统一但不统一的欧洲——却缺乏制度上的支撑,因此沿袭了德国的空中楼阁传统。他假设,小国将和平和谐地共存,因此,是否存在任何国际关系的问题似乎是合理的。与此同时,他呼吁建立一个可变几何的欧洲,或称“ la carte”(第390页)。由此可以假设,凯恩斯-波兰尼国家与欧盟的许多组成部分是不相容的,比如拥有固定债务和预算赤字限制的货币联盟成员国身份,以及禁止内部和外部资本管制。为了在欧盟实现预期的变化,不仅需要相当高的转移支付金额,而且还需要废除《财政公约》、“债务刹车”和禁止资本管制,同时恢复可能提供补贴的产业政策,执行“污染者付费”原则,增加公共部门的规模,以及抗危机能力和复原力。在这种背景下,为什么编辑在脚注中留下饺子和意大利面仍然是令人费解的。施特雷克将有关欧盟的亵渎神明的问题带回了理性话语的文化中,这一点尤其值得赞扬。无论如何,亲欧派必须回答几个触及问题核心的棘手问题,其中包括许多新自由主义成分。为什么在美国,像加利福尼亚这样的州可以引入更严格的排放标准,而在欧盟,一个成员国却不可能这样做?因此,欧盟是否比美国更新自由主义,或者至少欧盟内部市场比美国内部市场更新自由主义?为什么欧盟的最低标准必须同时是最高标准?在美国,汽车工业很快就适应了加州的标准,而不是在每种情况下生产不同类型的汽车;在欧洲,没有人被允许带头:在气候变化加速的时代,欧洲还能承受这种意识形态上的狭隘吗?