The Theory and Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives

Q2 Social Sciences Law and Contemporary Problems Pub Date : 2002-09-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.329484
M. Hall
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

In a recent commentary, health economist Jaime Robinson observed that "the fundamental flaw of managed care, in retrospect, was that it sought to navigate the tensions between limited resources and unlimited expectations without explaining exactly how it was so doing". One such failure is the absence, prior to the late 1990s, of any disclosure by HMOs that they use financial incentives to encourage physicians to contain costs, and of any explanation of how and why this is done. Other features of managed care are visible to all members, such as a limited network of providers, primary care gatekeeping, or prior authorization requirements. Physician incentives, however, are entirely behind the scenes. Disclosure of financial incentives to subscribers has occurred only in the past three years, in response to several legal pressures. These developments call for an assessment of the theory and practice of disclosing physician incentives. To what extent does HMOs' earlier silence about physician incentives account for the public's backlash against managed care and the failure to appreciate the need for making cost/benefit trade-offs in medicine? Now that disclosure is becoming more commonplace, will this help put managed care back on a better track? Or, is disclosure being done in an excessively legalistic environment that defeats its fundamental purposes? To gain better understanding of these issues, this article begins by summarizing the theoretical case for mandating disclosure of incentives, in terms of various types of information market failures. The article then analyzes the components of liability and regulatory law that require disclosure, observing how well each source of law responds to different aspects of the justification for disclosure. Following this, empirical literature is explored on the content, source, and timing of disclosures now being made, and on the impact of incentive disclosures. The article concludes by sketching a model approach to disclosure, one that provides information in layers, at different points and in varying levels of detail, as best suits people's desire and need for this information.
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HMO医师激励信息披露的理论与实践
在最近的一篇评论中,卫生经济学家杰米•罗宾逊(Jaime Robinson)指出,“回想起来,管理式医疗的根本缺陷在于,它试图在有限的资源和无限的期望之间寻找平衡,却没有确切解释它是如何做到的”。其中一个失败是,在20世纪90年代末之前,hmo没有披露他们使用财务激励来鼓励医生控制成本,也没有解释如何以及为什么这样做。管理式医疗的其他特性对所有成员都是可见的,例如有限的提供者网络、初级保健把关或事先授权要求。然而,医生的动机完全在幕后。为了应对几项法律压力,仅在过去三年才向订户披露了财务激励措施。这些发展要求对披露医生激励的理论和实践进行评估。hmo早先对医生激励的沉默在多大程度上解释了公众对管理式医疗的强烈反对,以及未能认识到在医学中进行成本/收益权衡的必要性?既然信息披露变得越来越普遍,这是否有助于让管理式医疗回到更好的轨道上呢?或者,信息披露是在一个过于拘泥于法律的环境中进行的,违背了其根本目的?为了更好地理解这些问题,本文首先从各种类型的信息市场失灵的角度,总结了强制披露激励措施的理论案例。然后,本文分析了要求披露的责任和监管法律的组成部分,观察每个法律来源如何很好地回应披露理由的不同方面。在此之后,实证文献探讨了目前正在进行的披露的内容、来源和时间,以及激励披露的影响。文章最后概述了一种披露的模型方法,这种方法以最适合人们对这种信息的渴望和需要的方式,在不同的点和不同的细节层次上分层提供信息。
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来源期刊
Law and Contemporary Problems
Law and Contemporary Problems Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
期刊介绍: Law and Contemporary Problems was founded in 1933 and is the oldest journal published at Duke Law School. It is a quarterly, interdisciplinary, faculty-edited publication of Duke Law School. L&CP recognizes that many fields in the sciences, social sciences, and humanities can enhance the development and understanding of law. It is our purpose to seek out these areas of overlap and to publish balanced symposia that enlighten not just legal readers, but readers from these other disciplines as well. L&CP uses a symposium format, generally publishing one symposium per issue on a topic of contemporary concern. Authors and articles are selected to ensure that each issue collectively creates a unified presentation of the contemporary problem under consideration. L&CP hosts an annual conference at Duke Law School featuring the authors of one of the year’s four symposia.
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