{"title":"Sobre el rol propedéutico de las intuiciones desde una perspectiva racionalista naturalista","authors":"Rafael Miranda","doi":"10.4067/s0717-554x2019000300347","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"espanolResumen: El objetivo principal de este escrito es proponer un papel propedeutico de las intuiciones racionales, a fin de defender una propuesta hibrida entre el acceso epistemico a priori y a posteriori. Las intuiciones racionales deben ser informadas empiricamente, y descartadas cuando hay pruebas contra ellas, cuando la evidencia empirica muestra que la intuicion racional es errada, por lo que cualquier creencia guiada por ella tambien lo seria. Se sostiene que las intuiciones racionales cumplen un importante rol propedeutico: ayudan a comprender diferentes escenarios modales a traves de ejemplificaciones contrafacticas. Esto no se opone a la variacion cultural de intuiciones, por ello se propone un confiabilismo intuicional variable. Esta propuesta comprende a las intuiciones como falibles y como no conductoras de verdad: no es el objetivo de las intuiciones rastrear la verdad de alguna proposicion, sino ayudar a comprender los escenarios hipoteticos que pueden ser relevantes en diferentes areas. EnglishAbstract: The main target of this paper is to propose a preparatory learning role of rational intuitions, in order to defend a hybrid proposal between a priori and a posteriori epistemic access. Rational intuitions must be informed empirically, and discarded when there is evidence against them, when empirical evidence shows that rational intuition is wrong, so any belief guided by it would also be wrong. It is argued that rational intuitions play an important propaedeutic role: they help to understand different modal scenarios through counterfactual exemplifications. This is not opposed to the cultural variation of intuitions, therefore a variable intuitional reliability is proposed. This proposal includes intuitions as fallible and as not truth conducive: it is not the goal of intuitions to trace the truth of a proposition, but to help understand the hypothetical scenarios that may be relevant in different areas.","PeriodicalId":54112,"journal":{"name":"Cinta de Moebio","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cinta de Moebio","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4067/s0717-554x2019000300347","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
espanolResumen: El objetivo principal de este escrito es proponer un papel propedeutico de las intuiciones racionales, a fin de defender una propuesta hibrida entre el acceso epistemico a priori y a posteriori. Las intuiciones racionales deben ser informadas empiricamente, y descartadas cuando hay pruebas contra ellas, cuando la evidencia empirica muestra que la intuicion racional es errada, por lo que cualquier creencia guiada por ella tambien lo seria. Se sostiene que las intuiciones racionales cumplen un importante rol propedeutico: ayudan a comprender diferentes escenarios modales a traves de ejemplificaciones contrafacticas. Esto no se opone a la variacion cultural de intuiciones, por ello se propone un confiabilismo intuicional variable. Esta propuesta comprende a las intuiciones como falibles y como no conductoras de verdad: no es el objetivo de las intuiciones rastrear la verdad de alguna proposicion, sino ayudar a comprender los escenarios hipoteticos que pueden ser relevantes en diferentes areas. EnglishAbstract: The main target of this paper is to propose a preparatory learning role of rational intuitions, in order to defend a hybrid proposal between a priori and a posteriori epistemic access. Rational intuitions must be informed empirically, and discarded when there is evidence against them, when empirical evidence shows that rational intuition is wrong, so any belief guided by it would also be wrong. It is argued that rational intuitions play an important propaedeutic role: they help to understand different modal scenarios through counterfactual exemplifications. This is not opposed to the cultural variation of intuitions, therefore a variable intuitional reliability is proposed. This proposal includes intuitions as fallible and as not truth conducive: it is not the goal of intuitions to trace the truth of a proposition, but to help understand the hypothetical scenarios that may be relevant in different areas.
摘要:本文的主要目的是提出理性直觉的先验作用,以捍卫先验和后验认识论途径之间的混合建议。理性直觉应该被经验地告知,当有证据反对它们时,当经验证据表明理性直觉是错误的,因此任何由理性直觉引导的信仰都是错误的。本文认为,理性直觉发挥着重要的先导作用:它们通过反事实例证帮助理解不同的情态情景。这并不反对直觉的文化差异,因此提出了可变直觉可靠性。这个命题将直觉理解为易犯错误和不引导真理:直觉的目的不是追踪某个命题的真理,而是帮助理解在不同领域可能相关的假设场景。英语解释:本文的主要目的是提出理性直觉的预备学习角色,以捍卫先验和后验认知途径之间的混合命题。Rational intuitions必须告知empirically, and discarded when there is证据,经验证据显示该Rational intuition is时出错,所以任何信仰guided by it将国内流离失所者错了。It is rational intuitions argued that play an important propaedeutic作用:they help to明白不同modal假想through counterfactual exemplifications。这与直觉的文化变异并不矛盾,因此提出了一个可变的直觉可靠性。这一命题包括易犯错误和不真实的直觉:它不是直觉的目的来确定命题的真实性,而是帮助理解可能在不同领域相关的假设情景。
期刊介绍:
Cinta de Moebio publishes scientific articles and essays on epistemology of social science. The editorial experience of the magazine indicates that some academics send articles of philosophy, but of issues that are not related to the social sciences, as well as academics who sent the results of their research or projects in the social sciences, but its focus is not epistemology, which also are geared out to the purpose of the journal. The journal, put it in some way, it is in the dialogue of philosophy with social science and, therefore, both domains must be present in the articles.