Reconciling the 'Bittersweet Chemistry' between Technology and Corporate Takeovers through Reinforcing National Security Interests in Merger Control

Justice Mudzamiri, P. Osode
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Abstract

This article argues that company takeover regulation regimes must carefully balance two opposing notions. On the one hand, the regime must be designed to enable or facilitate the initiation and successful implementation of takeovers and mergers in the interests of economic growth and technological advancement. On the other hand, such a regulatory framework ought to be sensitive to the ever-increasing need to protect national security interests, especially from veiled threats. These threats include cybercrimes, private data hacking and espionage, which are endemic to takeovers contemplated by foreign persons that possess technological sophistication and are leaders in the rapidly unfolding Fourth Industrial Revolution. Recently some jurisdictions, such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom, have been active in reforming their investment laws to particularly strengthen the protection of national security interests. Similarly, in South Africa the debut introduction of section 18A of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018 has enabled the addition of a concurrent but parallel standard to the pre-existing merger control criteria prescribed under section 12A of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. This article evaluates the efficacy of South Africa's framework for national security interests' protection in the context of merger control using its US and UK counterparts as comparators. Ultimately, the article proposes reforming the existing statutory and institutional framework to effectively accommodate national security interests in South African merger control.
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通过加强并购控制中的国家安全利益,调和技术与企业收购之间的“苦乐参半的化学反应”
本文认为,公司收购监管制度必须谨慎地平衡两种对立的观念。一方面,为了经济增长和技术进步的利益,该制度的设计必须能够或促进收购和合并的发起和成功实施。另一方面,这样一个监管框架应该对日益增长的保护国家安全利益的需求保持敏感,尤其是不受隐性威胁的影响。这些威胁包括网络犯罪、私人数据黑客攻击和间谍活动,这些都是拥有先进技术、在迅速展开的第四次工业革命中处于领先地位的外国人考虑进行收购时所面临的常见威胁。最近,一些司法管辖区,如美利坚合众国和联合王国,积极改革其投资法,特别加强对国家安全利益的保护。同样,在南非,2018年《第18号竞争修正案》第18A条的首次引入,使得在1998年《第89号竞争法》第12A条规定的现有合并控制标准之外,增加了一个同时存在但平行的标准。本文以美国和英国为对照,评估了南非在并购控制背景下国家安全利益保护框架的有效性。最后,本文建议改革现有的法律和制度框架,以有效地适应南非并购控制中的国家安全利益。
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