Democracy, expertise and loyalty: Spoils systems or experts’ oligarchy

Abstract

Virtue of loyalty represents one of the core virtues in democratic systems, as it enables the will of citizens to be implemented via decisions of elected government. Expertise represents a necessary attribute of every successful state apparatus, and it is an inevitable ingredient of all progress. This paper aims to explain the dynamic relationship between expertise and loyalty of non-elected personnel in democratic societies, with the focus on developing democracies, like the Serbian democracy. Neglection of loyalty to the legitimately elected government in favor of expertise undermines the core principles of democracy and drives a society into a sort of ?expert oligarchy?, in which there is no equality, and the will of the majority is ignored by the expert elite. On the other hand, neglection of expertise of appointed personnel in favor of their loyalty, as seen in the so-called spoils systems, is a recipe for a disaster and erosion of the entire society, as it places the state in the hands of ignorant laymen who can only offer unlimited loyalty. It is necessary to establish a minimum of expertise and loyalty of appointed, non-elected, personnel in democracies in order to create optimal conditions for progress. Inability to respect the principle of minimal expertise when appointing personnel in state apparatus suggests faulty policy and unfoundedness of policy of legitimately elected government.