Interacting Corporate Political Activities with Evidence from the Tobacco Industry

IF 1.4 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Business and Politics Pub Date : 2021-07-30 DOI:10.1017/bap.2021.7
Kartik Rao, B. Schaufele
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Abstract

Abstract Research on firm-level corporate political activity often treats firm-government interactions as independent of the market competition between firms. Yet, firms that compete in the market will consider rivals when making strategic nonmarket decisions. Ignoring market rivalry when studying nonmarket strategy introduces fundamental endogeneity problems and potentially overlooks a central mechanism explaining firms’ political choices. Our study demonstrates this by investigating the strategic nonmarket interactions of large US tobacco manufacturers, a case study that is independently interesting. From 1992 to 2008, the US tobacco industry experienced dramatic upheaval in its business environment as regulatory authority shifted from the state to federal level, under the Food and Drug Administration. Using firm-candidate–cycle data, a complete information campaign contributions game, played in the nonmarket environment, is estimated for two of the United States’ largest tobacco manufacturers. Results demonstrate that, rather than acting in isolation, US tobacco firms strategically coordinated their firm-level political campaign contributions.
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企业政治活动与烟草业证据的互动
企业层面的企业政治活动研究往往将企业与政府的互动视为独立于企业之间的市场竞争。然而,在市场上竞争的公司在做出战略性非市场决策时会考虑竞争对手。在研究非市场战略时忽视市场竞争会引入基本的内生性问题,并可能忽视解释企业政治选择的核心机制。我们的研究通过调查美国大型烟草制造商的战略性非市场互动来证明这一点,这是一个独立有趣的案例研究。从1992年到2008年,美国烟草业的商业环境经历了巨大的动荡,监管权力从州一级转移到联邦一级,由美国食品和药物管理局(fda)管理。利用公司-候选人周期数据,对美国两家最大的烟草制造商在非市场环境下进行的完整的信息竞选捐款博弈进行了估计。结果表明,美国烟草公司不是孤立行动,而是在战略上协调其公司层面的政治竞选捐款。
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来源期刊
Business and Politics
Business and Politics Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
16.70%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: Business and Politics solicits articles within the broad area of the interaction between firms and political actors. Two specific areas are of particular interest to the journal. The first concerns the use of non-market corporate strategy. These efforts include internal organizational design decisions as well as external strategies. Internal organizational design refers to management structure, sourcing decisions, and transnational organization with respect to the firm"s non-market environment. External strategies include legal tactics, testimony, lobbying and other means to influence policy makers at all levels of government and international institutions as an adjunct to market strategies of the firm.
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