Housing is a critical part of every state’s infrastructure. However, in most advanced economies the state no longer builds very much of it, leaving it instead to private housebuilders. Because of their control over the supply of land, and the barriers to entry into the housebuilding industry, private housebuilders have potentially major structural power over the state. At the same time, private housebuilders are also tied to their land, and face other barriers to exit, thus limiting their ability to relocate capital elsewhere. Drawing on a range of secondary data sources, including earnings calls transcripts, annual reports and government policy documents, this paper demonstrates how the three largest volume housebuilders in England leveraged their structural power to shape the mortgage market support schemes that were introduced in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. These schemes have since underpinned their exceptional levels of profitability. We conclude, though, that far from being an absolute resource, this structural power was only enabled by the prevailing neoliberal, home-owning Anglo-liberal ‘growth model’ in which these housebuilders were embedded.
{"title":"Housebuilding, land, and structural power: the case of mortgage market support schemes in England","authors":"Chris Foye, Edward Shepherd","doi":"10.1017/bap.2024.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2024.19","url":null,"abstract":"Housing is a critical part of every state’s infrastructure. However, in most advanced economies the state no longer builds very much of it, leaving it instead to private housebuilders. Because of their control over the supply of land, and the barriers to entry into the housebuilding industry, private housebuilders have potentially major structural power over the state. At the same time, private housebuilders are also tied to their land, and face other barriers to exit, thus limiting their ability to relocate capital elsewhere. Drawing on a range of secondary data sources, including earnings calls transcripts, annual reports and government policy documents, this paper demonstrates how the three largest volume housebuilders in England leveraged their structural power to shape the mortgage market support schemes that were introduced in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. These schemes have since underpinned their exceptional levels of profitability. We conclude, though, that far from being an absolute resource, this structural power was only enabled by the prevailing neoliberal, home-owning Anglo-liberal ‘growth model’ in which these housebuilders were embedded.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142268735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper documents significant partisan divides across a range of corporate cultural values. Using panel data of 2,424 S&P 1500 firms spanning the period from 2001 to 2018, we find that firms whose top management teams lean toward the Democratic Party exhibit higher cultural values of integrity, teamwork, innovation, respect, and quality, in comparison with firms with executives leaning toward the Republican Party. In addition, we find that the partisan gap diminishes when firms have less entrenched management or locate in states with stronger judicial accountability. Our findings lend support to earlier research suggesting that leader characteristics are associated with corporate culture.
{"title":"Blue versus red: partisan firm leaders and corporate culture","authors":"Anqi Jiao, Honglin Ren","doi":"10.1017/bap.2024.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2024.12","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents significant partisan divides across a range of corporate cultural values. Using panel data of 2,424 S&P 1500 firms spanning the period from 2001 to 2018, we find that firms whose top management teams lean toward the Democratic Party exhibit higher cultural values of integrity, teamwork, innovation, respect, and quality, in comparison with firms with executives leaning toward the Republican Party. In addition, we find that the partisan gap diminishes when firms have less entrenched management or locate in states with stronger judicial accountability. Our findings lend support to earlier research suggesting that leader characteristics are associated with corporate culture.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140832735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public decision-makers incorporate algorithm decision aids, often developed by private businesses, into the policy process, in part, as a method for justifying difficult decisions. Ethicists have worried that over-trust in algorithm advice and concerns about punishment if departing from an algorithm’s recommendation will result in over-reliance and harm democratic accountability. We test these concerns in a set of two pre-registered survey experiments in the judicial context conducted on three representative U.S. samples. The results show no support for the hypothesized blame dynamics, regardless of whether the judge agrees or disagrees with the algorithm. Algorithms, moreover, do not have a significant impact relative to other sources of advice. Respondents who are generally more trusting of elites assign greater blame to the decision-maker when they disagree with the algorithm, and they assign more blame when they think the decision-maker is abdicating their responsibility by agreeing with an algorithm.
{"title":"The Paradox of Algorithms and Blame on Public Decision-makers","authors":"Adam L. Ozer, Philip D. Waggoner, Ryan Kennedy","doi":"10.1017/bap.2023.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2023.35","url":null,"abstract":"Public decision-makers incorporate algorithm decision aids, often developed by private businesses, into the policy process, in part, as a method for justifying difficult decisions. Ethicists have worried that over-trust in algorithm advice and concerns about punishment if departing from an algorithm’s recommendation will result in over-reliance and harm democratic accountability. We test these concerns in a set of two pre-registered survey experiments in the judicial context conducted on three representative U.S. samples. The results show no support for the hypothesized blame dynamics, regardless of whether the judge agrees or disagrees with the algorithm. Algorithms, moreover, do not have a significant impact relative to other sources of advice. Respondents who are generally more trusting of elites assign greater blame to the decision-maker when they disagree with the algorithm, and they assign more blame when they think the decision-maker is abdicating their responsibility by agreeing with an algorithm.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140148533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andrew Lugg, Kirthana Ganeson, Manfred Elsig, Julien Chaisse, Sufian Jusoh
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is one of the most important mega-regional trade agreements signed to date. Yet, it failed to include an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism in its investment chapter. What explains this omission? To unpack this, we examine international negotiations as a two-step process. In the first stage, we theorize that initial preferences towards ISDS are based on countries’ orientation toward foreign direct investment (FDI), experience with ISDS, and past treaty practice. Second, we theorize that during protracted negotiations, adverse regime developments and domestic politics can have a profound impact on treaty design. To test our framework, we examine the RCEP negotiations. Our analysis shows that mounting cases as well as the eroding norm of ISDS in other treaties lowered support for ISDS as the negotiations progressed. Then, a change of government in Malaysia shifted that country’s position dramatically, which tipped the balance against ISDS in the final round of negotiations. Our findings have important implications for the international investment regime. They highlight the factors that determine countries’ initial preferences while also demonstrating the importance of developments during the negotiations, which can lead to the abandonment of the institutional status quo.
{"title":"Why is there no investor-state dispute settlement in RCEP? bargaining and contestation in the investment regime","authors":"Andrew Lugg, Kirthana Ganeson, Manfred Elsig, Julien Chaisse, Sufian Jusoh","doi":"10.1017/bap.2024.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2024.8","url":null,"abstract":"The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is one of the most important mega-regional trade agreements signed to date. Yet, it failed to include an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism in its investment chapter. What explains this omission? To unpack this, we examine international negotiations as a two-step process. In the first stage, we theorize that initial preferences towards ISDS are based on countries’ orientation toward foreign direct investment (FDI), experience with ISDS, and past treaty practice. Second, we theorize that during protracted negotiations, adverse regime developments and domestic politics can have a profound impact on treaty design. To test our framework, we examine the RCEP negotiations. Our analysis shows that mounting cases as well as the eroding norm of ISDS in other treaties lowered support for ISDS as the negotiations progressed. Then, a change of government in Malaysia shifted that country’s position dramatically, which tipped the balance against ISDS in the final round of negotiations. Our findings have important implications for the international investment regime. They highlight the factors that determine countries’ initial preferences while also demonstrating the importance of developments during the negotiations, which can lead to the abandonment of the institutional status quo.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140166498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charles W. Mahoney, Benjamin K. Tkach, Craig J. Rethmeyer
Defense contractors play an essential role in US security operations. Among other responsibilities, contractors manufacture arms, manage logistics, analyze intelligence, and carry out cybersecurity operations. Historically, defense contractors were either publicly traded corporations or privately owned companies. The past two decades, however, have seen a major shift in the ownership structure of the US defense industry. Private equity firms—once niche actors in the US national security marketplace—have carried out over 1,500 deals involving defense contractors since 2000. This study employs a mixed-methods research design to assess the effects of private equity investment on the financial stability of the US defense industry. Using data on over 8,000 defense contractors, the inquiry finds that contractors with private equity backing experience bankruptcy at higher rates than contractors with no prior private equity investment. In addition, the study evaluates private equity activity in the military satellite services market—a field of growing importance in the strategically important domain of outer space. The inquiry’s findings have notable international security implications. Given the US’ role as a lynchpin in numerous alliances around the world, higher rates of bankruptcy among defense contractors have the potential to affect the security of the United States and its allies.
{"title":"Leveraging national security: private equity and bankruptcy in the United States defense industry","authors":"Charles W. Mahoney, Benjamin K. Tkach, Craig J. Rethmeyer","doi":"10.1017/bap.2023.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2023.33","url":null,"abstract":"Defense contractors play an essential role in US security operations. Among other responsibilities, contractors manufacture arms, manage logistics, analyze intelligence, and carry out cybersecurity operations. Historically, defense contractors were either publicly traded corporations or privately owned companies. The past two decades, however, have seen a major shift in the ownership structure of the US defense industry. Private equity firms—once niche actors in the US national security marketplace—have carried out over 1,500 deals involving defense contractors since 2000. This study employs a mixed-methods research design to assess the effects of private equity investment on the financial stability of the US defense industry. Using data on over 8,000 defense contractors, the inquiry finds that contractors with private equity backing experience bankruptcy at higher rates than contractors with no prior private equity investment. In addition, the study evaluates private equity activity in the military satellite services market—a field of growing importance in the strategically important domain of outer space. The inquiry’s findings have notable international security implications. Given the US’ role as a lynchpin in numerous alliances around the world, higher rates of bankruptcy among defense contractors have the potential to affect the security of the United States and its allies.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140166595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Srinivas Parinandi, Jesse Crosson, Kai Peterson, Sinan Nadarevic
The rapid emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) technology and its application by businesses has created a potential need for governmental regulation. While the federal government of the United States has largely sidestepped the issue of crafting law dictating limitations and expectations regarding the use of AI technology, US state legislatures have begun to take the lead in this area. Nonetheless, we know very little about how state legislatures have approached the design, pursuit, and adoption of AI policy and whether traditional political fault lines have manifested themselves in the AI issue area. Here, we gather data on the state-level adoption of AI policy, as well as roll call voting on AI bills (classified on the basis of consumer protection versus economic development), by state legislatures and analyze the political economy of AI legislation. We find that rising unemployment and inflation are negatively associated with a state’s AI policymaking. With respect to individual legislator support, we find that liberal lawmakers and Democrats are more likely to support bills establishing consumer protection requirements on AI usage. The results suggest that economic concerns loom large with AI and that traditional political fault lines may be establishing themselves in this area.
{"title":"Investigating the politics and content of US State artificial intelligence legislation","authors":"Srinivas Parinandi, Jesse Crosson, Kai Peterson, Sinan Nadarevic","doi":"10.1017/bap.2023.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2023.40","url":null,"abstract":"The rapid emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) technology and its application by businesses has created a potential need for governmental regulation. While the federal government of the United States has largely sidestepped the issue of crafting law dictating limitations and expectations regarding the use of AI technology, US state legislatures have begun to take the lead in this area. Nonetheless, we know very little about how state legislatures have approached the design, pursuit, and adoption of AI policy and whether traditional political fault lines have manifested themselves in the AI issue area. Here, we gather data on the state-level adoption of AI policy, as well as roll call voting on AI bills (classified on the basis of consumer protection versus economic development), by state legislatures and analyze the political economy of AI legislation. We find that rising unemployment and inflation are negatively associated with a state’s AI policymaking. With respect to individual legislator support, we find that liberal lawmakers and Democrats are more likely to support bills establishing consumer protection requirements on AI usage. The results suggest that economic concerns loom large with AI and that traditional political fault lines may be establishing themselves in this area.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140166833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do voters shun some business tycoons yet elect others into power? As structural conditions facilitate the entry of super-wealthy actors into politics, the differential electoral support across business elites suggests a puzzle. We conceptualize four mechanisms behind the popular support for “tycoon candidates”: competence signaling, framing, fame, and clientelism. To test their relative efficacy, we leverage an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in South Africa, an important developing democracy where certain tycoons are successfully running for office. We find that, across distinct electoral appeals by tycoon candidates, clientelism is particularly effective, especially for mobilizing support from the less affluent voters. Racial framing significantly decreases support among white voters. Meanwhile, tycoons’ competence signaling or fame do not help them at the ballot box. By identifying the micro-level underpinnings of voter support across tycoon candidates, our study contributes to the literatures on business and politics, voting behavior, and clientelism.
{"title":"Tycoon candidates, electoral strategies, and voter support: a survey experiment in South Africa","authors":"Mogens K. Justesen, Stanislav Markus","doi":"10.1017/bap.2024.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2024.4","url":null,"abstract":"Why do voters shun some business tycoons yet elect others into power? As structural conditions facilitate the entry of super-wealthy actors into politics, the differential electoral support across business elites suggests a puzzle. We conceptualize four mechanisms behind the popular support for “tycoon candidates”: competence signaling, framing, fame, and clientelism. To test their relative efficacy, we leverage an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in South Africa, an important developing democracy where certain tycoons are successfully running for office. We find that, across distinct electoral appeals by tycoon candidates, clientelism is particularly effective, especially for mobilizing support from the less affluent voters. Racial framing significantly decreases support among white voters. Meanwhile, tycoons’ competence signaling or fame do not help them at the ballot box. By identifying the micro-level underpinnings of voter support across tycoon candidates, our study contributes to the literatures on business and politics, voting behavior, and clientelism.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140166495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alejandro Osorio-Rauld, Alejandro Pelfini, Lluís Català-Oltra, Francisco Francés
In contexts of institutional crisis, conflicts arise in which different pressure groups try to maximize their influence, seeking to adjust a political reality in line with their own interest. This article analyzes the changes in the attitudes of economic elites regarding the process of drafting of a new Constitution in Chile. Based on the literature on the political culture of entrepreneurs, the research hypothesis posed in this study suggests the existence of a widespread conservative attitude within this social group regarding a change in institutional rules. This mainly relates to the perception that a new Constitution in Chile could threaten its predominant place in the distribution of economic and political power. The results obtained after analyzing in-depth interviews with presidents or vice presidents of the main business organizations in the country show changing positions throughout the different stages of the constituent process. Even though some attitudinal changes towards an adaptation become visible, what ultimately prevails is an unmitigated rejection of the constituent process. These findings clearly suggest a return to the initial stances of most entrepreneurs, something that also happened in the elite examined as well as in the rest of Chilean society. Thus, one can speak about a sort of “boomerang effect”: the attitudes of rejection have once again dominated the space of discursive expression where the pressure exerted by public opinion seemed to pave the way for a certain reformism or a transforming reaction. This evidence confirms a disconnection found in the literature which reveals the dynamic nature of short-term attitudes linked to each specific situation, albeit with more stable values and positions specific to the political culture which exist on a more persistent basis.
{"title":"Political culture and attitudes of economic elites: explaining the Chilean business community’s rejection to constitutional change","authors":"Alejandro Osorio-Rauld, Alejandro Pelfini, Lluís Català-Oltra, Francisco Francés","doi":"10.1017/bap.2023.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2023.39","url":null,"abstract":"In contexts of institutional crisis, conflicts arise in which different pressure groups try to maximize their influence, seeking to adjust a political reality in line with their own interest. This article analyzes the changes in the attitudes of economic elites regarding the process of drafting of a new Constitution in Chile. Based on the literature on the political culture of entrepreneurs, the research hypothesis posed in this study suggests the existence of a widespread conservative attitude within this social group regarding a change in institutional rules. This mainly relates to the perception that a new Constitution in Chile could threaten its predominant place in the distribution of economic and political power. The results obtained after analyzing in-depth interviews with presidents or vice presidents of the main business organizations in the country show changing positions throughout the different stages of the constituent process. Even though some attitudinal changes towards an adaptation become visible, what ultimately prevails is an unmitigated rejection of the constituent process. These findings clearly suggest a return to the initial stances of most entrepreneurs, something that also happened in the elite examined as well as in the rest of Chilean society. Thus, one can speak about a sort of “boomerang effect”: the attitudes of rejection have once again dominated the space of discursive expression where the pressure exerted by public opinion seemed to pave the way for a certain reformism or a transforming reaction. This evidence confirms a disconnection found in the literature which reveals the dynamic nature of short-term attitudes linked to each specific situation, albeit with more stable values and positions specific to the political culture which exist on a more persistent basis.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140166602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the motives and mechanisms behind data localization implemented by states to protect data, which is essential to emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence. Despite the significant negative aspects of data localization for states, the practice has become increasingly prevalent, leading to the unexplored question of why states choose to implement it. This suggests that data localization is a form of economic means derived from digital technologies and employed by states to serve political objectives. Focusing on the data in platforms, the theoretical mechanism of data localization is captured in light of two factors: network perception and security externality. Network perception pertains to a state’s perception of the positive network effect generated by platforms, while security externality refers to a state’s consideration of the security implications in relation to the economic benefits derived from the positive network effect, serving the national interest in domestic and/or international contexts. To substantiate these theoretical propositions, the paper employs a comparative case study approach where Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia have been chosen as empirical cases based on the selection strategy. The paper bridges the concept of economic statecraft with digital technologies, fosters interdisciplinary discussions, and offers policy implications.
{"title":"Data and statecraft: why and how states localize data","authors":"Sanghyun Han","doi":"10.1017/bap.2023.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2023.41","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the motives and mechanisms behind data localization implemented by states to protect data, which is essential to emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence. Despite the significant negative aspects of data localization for states, the practice has become increasingly prevalent, leading to the unexplored question of why states choose to implement it. This suggests that data localization is a form of economic means derived from digital technologies and employed by states to serve political objectives. Focusing on the data in platforms, the theoretical mechanism of data localization is captured in light of two factors: network perception and security externality. Network perception pertains to a state’s perception of the positive network effect generated by platforms, while security externality refers to a state’s consideration of the security implications in relation to the economic benefits derived from the positive network effect, serving the national interest in domestic and/or international contexts. To substantiate these theoretical propositions, the paper employs a comparative case study approach where Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia have been chosen as empirical cases based on the selection strategy. The paper bridges the concept of economic statecraft with digital technologies, fosters interdisciplinary discussions, and offers policy implications.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"236 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140148554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our aim with this special issue on the future of artificial intelligence (AI) politics, policy, and business is to give space to considering how the balalnce between risk and reward from AI technologies is and perhaps should be pursued by the public and private sectors. Ultimately, private firms and regulators will need to work collaboratively, given the complex networks of actors involved in AI development and deployment and the potential for the technology to alter existing policy regimes. We begin the introduction of this special issue of Business & Politics with a discussion of the growth in AI technology use and discussions of appropriate governance, followed by a consideration of how AI-related politics, policy, and business intersect. We then summarize the contributions of the authors in this issue and conclude with thoughts about how political science, public administration, and public policy scholars have much to offer, as well as much to study, the establishment of effective AI governance.
{"title":"The future of AI politics, policy, and business","authors":"Eric Best, Pedro Robles, Daniel J. Mallinson","doi":"10.1017/bap.2024.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2024.6","url":null,"abstract":"Our aim with this special issue on the future of artificial intelligence (AI) politics, policy, and business is to give space to considering how the balalnce between risk and reward from AI technologies is and perhaps should be pursued by the public and private sectors. Ultimately, private firms and regulators will need to work collaboratively, given the complex networks of actors involved in AI development and deployment and the potential for the technology to alter existing policy regimes. We begin the introduction of this special issue of Business & Politics with a discussion of the growth in AI technology use and discussions of appropriate governance, followed by a consideration of how AI-related politics, policy, and business intersect. We then summarize the contributions of the authors in this issue and conclude with thoughts about how political science, public administration, and public policy scholars have much to offer, as well as much to study, the establishment of effective AI governance.","PeriodicalId":39749,"journal":{"name":"Business and Politics","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140148555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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