Testimony as an a Priori Basis of Acceptance: Problems and Prospects

Abstract

This paper explores the possibility that testimony is an a priori source, even if not a basic source, of rational support for certain kinds of cognitions, particularly for a kind of acceptance that it is natural to call presumption. The inquiry is conducted in the light of two impor tant distinctions and the relation between them. One distinction is between belief and acceptance, the other between justification and rationality. Cognitive acceptance is also distinguished from behavioral acceptance, and their normative status is shown to be governed by quite different principles. A major focus in the paper is the question of how the epistemic authority of testimony for cognitive acceptance of its content may depend on normative elements implicit in the kind of language learning and social coordination that are normal for at least the majority of human beings. The importance of testimony in the development of human knowledge is clear. But there remains disagreement about its epistemic significance, particularly concerning its ability to confer non-inferential justification or the status of non-inferential knowledge on testimony-based beliefs. I have argued that it can do both, but is nonetheless not on a par with such basic sources of justification and knowledge as perception and reflection. A source need not be basic, however, to be a priori, and a