The 'True and Full' Opportunity Costs Of Non-Compliance For Regulated Entities

D. Ireland
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Abstract

The scathing report of the American Congress in September 2020 on the Boeing 737 Max crashes and regulatory fiasco underlines the risks and dangers that result from governments and their regulatory authorities, regulated entities, the academic community and the media focusing solely on the business costs of regulatory compliance – while ignoring the costs of regulatory non-compliance for firms, the national economy and society. The purpose of the author’s research program and this working paper is to bring a behavioral economics lens to identifying the true and full opportunity costs of non-compliance by corporations and other regulated entities.

The paper argues that the conventional economics, and law and economics, approaches badly underestimate the net economic and social benefits from compliance and the true and full opportunity costs of non-compliance with laws, regulations and social norms. These more conventional approaches do not meet the interests and requirements of: governments and their regulatory authorities, civil society groups, potential and actual victims, and the overall society and national economy. Most importantly, this narrow benefit-cost approach and related metrics fall far short of satisfying the longer term regulatory requirements of regulated entities and their senior executives, managers, and employees, their compliance and corporate social responsibility advisors and divisions, and their supply chain and other business partners.

The working paper employs recent advances in the social psychology, behavioral economics, behavioral ethics, neuroscience, behavioral benefit-cost, and related less conventional economics literatures in order to identify twenty quite diverse but still interrelated sources and drivers of the true and full opportunity costs of non-compliance. These behaviorally informed sources and drivers are divided into three categories: (i) bounded rationality, cognitive scarcity, cognitive misers, and other system 1 attributes of the human brain; (ii) the financial, economic and social costs incurred and generated by non-compliant regulated entities; and, (iii) transaction, relationship and networking costs and related negative externalities.

The paper as well offers proposals on how: (i) state and non-state regulators can apply these behavioral insights on the opportunity costs of non-compliance when designing, implementing and framing their enforcement, deterrence, compliance promotion, communication, outreach and other activities; (ii) regulated entities can employ these insights when designing and implementing their corporate strategies on innovation, product development, marketing, voluntary compliance, and corporate social responsibility; (iii) consumers associations, environmental groups and other civil society groups as well as the academic and consulting communities can employ these insights in their analytical, advisory and advocacy functions; and (iv) more principles and outcomes based, inclusive, polycentric and shared accountability regulatory, legal and policy regimes can make the true and full opportunity costs of non-compliance more vivid, tangible, salient, and actionable for regulated entities and all other regulatory actors.
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受监管实体不合规的“真实和全部”机会成本
2020年9月,美国国会就波音737 Max坠机事件和监管惨败发表了措辞严厉的报告,强调了政府及其监管机构、被监管实体、学术界和媒体只关注合规的商业成本,而忽视了不合规给企业、国民经济和社会带来的成本,从而带来的风险和危险。作者的研究计划和这篇工作论文的目的是用行为经济学的视角来确定公司和其他受监管实体不合规的真实和全部机会成本。本文认为,传统经济学、法律经济学和经济学方法严重低估了遵守法律、法规和社会规范所带来的净经济效益和社会效益,以及不遵守法律、法规和社会规范的真实和全部机会成本。这些更传统的方法不符合政府及其监管机构、民间社会团体、潜在和实际受害者以及整个社会和国民经济的利益和要求。最重要的是,这种狭隘的效益-成本方法和相关指标远远不能满足受监管实体及其高级管理人员、经理和员工、其合规和企业社会责任顾问和部门、其供应链和其他业务伙伴的长期监管要求。这份工作文件采用了社会心理学、行为经济学、行为伦理学、神经科学、行为收益-成本以及相关的非常规经济学文献的最新进展,以确定20个相当不同但仍然相互关联的不合规真正和完全机会成本的来源和驱动因素。这些行为信息来源和驱动因素分为三类:(i)有限理性、认知稀缺性、认知吝啬鬼和人类大脑的其他系统1属性;(ii)不合规的受监管实体招致和产生的财务、经济和社会成本;(三)交易、关系和网络成本以及相关的负外部性。本文还提出了以下建议:(i)国家和非国家监管机构在设计、实施和构建执法、威慑、合规促进、沟通、推广和其他活动时,可以将这些行为见解应用于不合规的机会成本;(ii)受监管实体在设计和实施创新、产品开发、营销、自愿合规和企业社会责任方面的企业战略时,可以利用这些见解;(iii)消费者协会、环境团体和其他民间社会团体以及学术界和咨询界可以在其分析、咨询和宣传职能中利用这些见解;(四)更多以原则和结果为基础、包容、多中心和共享问责制的监管、法律和政策制度,可以使不合规的真实和全部机会成本对被监管实体和所有其他监管行为体来说更加生动、切实、突出和可操作。
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