Kratos and Other Forms of Power in the Two Constitutions of the Athenians

Abstract

What did kratos imply in the classical democratic context? Focusing on the two Constitutions of the Athenians traditionally attributed to Xenophon and Aristotle respectively, this article explores differences among kratos and three proximate terms: archē (de facto governance or magistracy), kuros (authority, perceived as legitimate), and dēmagōgia (leadership). With Benveniste and Loraux, it argues that kratos specifically signalled ‘superiority’ or ‘predominance’, as revealed in combat or other form of contest. Dēmokratia thereby connoted the forceful predominance of the dēmos (‘assembly’, ‘collective common people’) over the rest of the community, including office-holders (archontes, archai) and political leaders (dēmagōgoi). The association of kratos with force directs attention to the martial underpinnings of classical demotic authority, incidentally highlighting a weakness in modern democracy: the dēmos’ lack of kratos over the political elite when that elite controls military and police power.