{"title":"Guidance for Design and Operation of Pump Rooms Following the Explosion on the FPSO Cidade de São Mateus","authors":"M. Duddy, A. Ronza, Noorhafizal Zakariah","doi":"10.4043/31639-ms","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n On the 11th of February 2015 a pump room explosion on the Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) Cidade de São Mateus killed nine persons, injured twenty-six more and crippled the unit, requiring that it be removed to a yard to effect repairs. In 2020 the FPSO Owner confirmed that the FPSO Charter and the Services Agreements with the respective Oil and Gas Company had reached their final terms and the unit remained in lay-up in Singapore.\n Seven years on from this event, although the causes leading up to the incident are well understood within some sections of the oil and gas industry, along with the availability of various high-quality publications on the subject, there remains no consolidated guidance from Classification Societies, regulatory authorities, insurers nor industry advisory groups on how to prevent a reoccurrence of a similar event. Indeed, some FSO/FPSO operators have not implemented the required changes within their existing fleet or within their subsequently developed facilities.\n This paper provides a synopsis of the incident onboard the FPSO Cidade de São Mateus (CdSM) and the root causes of the accident. From those findings, it describes the design and operational measures some Floating Storage and Offloading (FSO)/FPSO owner/operators and oil and gas companies have implemented to further reduce the potential risks associated with the use of pump rooms. These measures are subsequently visualised by way of a bow-tie diagram. An overview of current Classification Society rules and regulatory authority requirements relating to pump rooms are shown and discussed. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates some of the flaws that still exist in the engineering and operation of contemporary FSO/FPSO pump rooms. As a continuation from those defects, several FPSO pump room incidents that have occurred after 2015, which could have led to a similar catastrophic pump room explosion to that of CdSM, are explained. Finally, the paper contains a recommended basis for design and operational guidance to owners and operators of FSO/FPSOs with pump rooms.","PeriodicalId":11217,"journal":{"name":"Day 4 Fri, March 25, 2022","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Day 4 Fri, March 25, 2022","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4043/31639-ms","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
On the 11th of February 2015 a pump room explosion on the Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) Cidade de São Mateus killed nine persons, injured twenty-six more and crippled the unit, requiring that it be removed to a yard to effect repairs. In 2020 the FPSO Owner confirmed that the FPSO Charter and the Services Agreements with the respective Oil and Gas Company had reached their final terms and the unit remained in lay-up in Singapore.
Seven years on from this event, although the causes leading up to the incident are well understood within some sections of the oil and gas industry, along with the availability of various high-quality publications on the subject, there remains no consolidated guidance from Classification Societies, regulatory authorities, insurers nor industry advisory groups on how to prevent a reoccurrence of a similar event. Indeed, some FSO/FPSO operators have not implemented the required changes within their existing fleet or within their subsequently developed facilities.
This paper provides a synopsis of the incident onboard the FPSO Cidade de São Mateus (CdSM) and the root causes of the accident. From those findings, it describes the design and operational measures some Floating Storage and Offloading (FSO)/FPSO owner/operators and oil and gas companies have implemented to further reduce the potential risks associated with the use of pump rooms. These measures are subsequently visualised by way of a bow-tie diagram. An overview of current Classification Society rules and regulatory authority requirements relating to pump rooms are shown and discussed. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates some of the flaws that still exist in the engineering and operation of contemporary FSO/FPSO pump rooms. As a continuation from those defects, several FPSO pump room incidents that have occurred after 2015, which could have led to a similar catastrophic pump room explosion to that of CdSM, are explained. Finally, the paper contains a recommended basis for design and operational guidance to owners and operators of FSO/FPSOs with pump rooms.
2015年2月11日,浮式生产储卸(FPSO) Cidade de s o Mateus的泵房发生爆炸,造成9人死亡,26人受伤,并导致该装置瘫痪,需要将其移至院子进行维修。2020年,FPSO所有者确认,与各自的石油和天然气公司签订的FPSO租约和服务协议已达成最终条款,该装置仍在新加坡停工。事故发生7年后,尽管油气行业的一些部门对事故原因已经有了很好的了解,也有了关于该主题的各种高质量出版物,但船级社、监管机构、保险公司和行业咨询团体仍然没有关于如何防止类似事件再次发生的统一指导。事实上,一些FSO/FPSO运营商并没有在他们现有的船队或随后开发的设施中实施所需的改变。本文简要介绍了FPSO Cidade de s o Mateus (CdSM)上发生的事故以及事故的根本原因。根据这些发现,本文描述了一些浮式储卸(FSO)/FPSO所有者/运营商以及油气公司为进一步降低与泵房使用相关的潜在风险而实施的设计和操作措施。这些措施随后通过领结图的方式可视化。当前船级社的规则和有关泵房监管当局的要求的概述显示和讨论。此外,本文还展示了当代浮式储油船/浮式储油船泵房在工程和操作中仍然存在的一些缺陷。作为这些缺陷的延续,2015年之后发生了几起FPSO泵室事故,这些事故可能导致与CdSM类似的灾难性泵室爆炸。最后,本文为带有泵房的FSO/ fpso的船东和运营商提供了设计和操作指导的建议基础。