Insolvency Close-Out Netting

IF 0.6 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-09-13 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3691954
S. Schwarcz
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This short paper, prepared for a colloquium on the Resolution of Financially Distressed Financial Institutions, explains insolvency close-out netting and its implications. The term refers to a special type of netting of offsetting derivatives obligations that entitles a derivatives counterparty, upon the occurrence of a bankruptcy or default relating to the other party, to terminate outstanding obligations and reduce the amounts mutually owing between the parties to a net amount. Although the purported goal of that netting is to reduce systemic risk, this paper critically analyzes the extent to which that occurs.
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这篇简短的论文是为解决财务困境的金融机构的讨论会而准备的,解释了破产关闭净额及其影响。该术语指的是一种特殊类型的抵销衍生品义务的净额,即衍生品交易对手在发生与另一方有关的破产或违约时,有权终止未偿债务并将双方相互欠下的金额减少到净额。尽管所谓的净收益目标是降低系统性风险,但本文批判性地分析了这种情况发生的程度。
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CiteScore
1.10
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0.00%
发文量
4
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