Revisiting the Computation Analysis against Internal Encodings in White-Box Implementations

Yufeng Tang, Zhenghu Gong, Bin Li, Liangju Zhao
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Abstract

White-box implementations aim to prevent the key extraction of the cryptographic algorithm even if the attacker has full access to the execution environment. To obfuscate the round functions, Chow et al. proposed a pivotal principle of white-box implementations to convert the round functions as look-up tables which are encoded by random internal encodings. These encodings consist of a linear mapping and a non-linear nibble permutation. At CHES 2016, Bos et al. introduced differential computation analysis (DCA) to extract the secret key from the runtime information, such as accessed memory and registers. Following this attack, many computation analysis methods were proposed to break the white-box implementations by leveraging some properties of the linear internal encodings, such as Hamming weight and imbalance. Therefore, it becomes an alternative choice to use a non-linear byte encoding to thwart DCA. At CHES 2021, Carlet et al. proposed a structural attack and revealed the weakness of the non-linear byte encodings which are combined with a non-invertible linear mapping. However, such a structural attack requires the details of the implementation, which relies on extra reverse engineering efforts in practice. To the best of our knowledge, it still lacks a thorough investigation of whether the non-linear byte encodings can resist the computation analyses.In this paper, we revisit the proposed computation analyses by investigating their capabilities against internal encodings with different algebraic degrees. Particularly, the algebraic degree of encodings is leveraged to explain the key leakage on the non-linear encodings. Based on this observation, we propose a new algebraic degree computation analysis (ADCA), which targets the mappings from the inputs to each sample of the computation traces. Different from the previous computation analyses, ADCA is a higher-degree attack that can distinguish the correct key by matching the algebraic degrees of the mappings. The experimental results prove that ADCA can break the internal encodings from degree 1 to 6 with the lowest time complexity. nstead of running different computation analyses separately, ADCA can be used as a generic tool to attack the white-box implementations.
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白盒实现中针对内部编码的计算分析
白盒实现旨在防止加密算法的密钥提取,即使攻击者对执行环境具有完全的访问权限。为了混淆圆形函数,Chow等人提出了白盒实现的关键原则,将圆形函数转换为由随机内部编码编码的查找表。这些编码由线性映射和非线性蚕食排列组成。在CHES 2016上,Bos等人引入了差分计算分析(DCA),从运行时信息(如访问的内存和寄存器)中提取密钥。在此攻击之后,提出了许多计算分析方法来利用线性内部编码的一些特性(如Hamming权重和不平衡)来打破白盒实现。因此,使用非线性字节编码来阻止DCA成为另一种选择。在CHES 2021上,Carlet等人提出了一种结构攻击,并揭示了非线性字节编码与非可逆线性映射相结合的弱点。然而,这样的结构性攻击需要实现的细节,这依赖于实践中额外的逆向工程工作。据我们所知,它仍然缺乏对非线性字节编码是否可以抵抗计算分析的深入研究。在本文中,我们通过研究它们对具有不同代数度的内部编码的能力来重新审视所提出的计算分析。特别地,利用编码的代数程度来解释非线性编码上的密钥泄漏。基于这一观察,我们提出了一种新的代数度计算分析(ADCA),其目标是从输入到计算轨迹的每个样本的映射。与以往的计算分析不同,ADCA是一种更高程度的攻击,通过匹配映射的代数度来区分正确的密钥。实验结果表明,该算法能够以最低的时间复杂度对1 ~ 6级的内部编码进行解码。ADCA可以作为攻击白盒实现的通用工具,而不是单独运行不同的计算分析。
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