Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better? A Buyback Puzzle

G. Boyle, Gerald Ward
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Abstract

We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction. However, those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average, earning 30% less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders. Moreover, this underperformance is concentrated in male horses, despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes. These puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities, or by nonfinancial objectives, or by behavioral or selection biases. (JEL G02, G11, G14, L83, D44)
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信息越灵通的投资者表现越好吗?回购难题
我们使用来自一个单一来源的数据来探索私人投资信息的价值:一岁赛马的拍卖。马饲养者对自己的马有很好的了解,并且有很强的经济动机在拍卖会上买回最好的马。然而,他们随后回购的马平均表现明显较差,在赛马场上的收益比外人购买的马少30%。此外,这种表现不佳集中在雄性马身上,尽管这些马是专门为比赛而购买的。这些令人困惑的发现不能用马匹风险或饲养员能力的差异、非财务目标、行为或选择偏见来解释。(凝胶g02, g11, g14, l83, d44)
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