The Effect of Credit Ratings on Disclosure: Evidence from the Recalibration of Moody’s Municipal Ratings

Jacquelyn R. Gillette, Delphine Samuels, Frank S. Zhou
{"title":"The Effect of Credit Ratings on Disclosure: Evidence from the Recalibration of Moody’s Municipal Ratings","authors":"Jacquelyn R. Gillette, Delphine Samuels, Frank S. Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3153143","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how credit rating levels affect municipal debt issuers’ disclosure decisions. Using exogenous upgrades in credit rating levels caused by the recalibration of Moody's municipal ratings scale in 2010, we find that upgraded municipalities significantly reduce their disclosure of required continuing financial information, relative to unaffected municipalities. Consistent with a reduction in debtholders’ demand for information driving these results, the reduction in disclosure is greater when municipal bonds are held by investors who relied more on disclosure ex ante. However, we also find that the reduction in disclosure does not manifest when issuers are monitored by underwriters with greater issuer‐specific expertise and when issuers are subject to direct regulatory enforcement through the receipt of federal funding. Overall, our results suggest that higher credit rating levels lower investor demand for disclosure in the municipal market, and highlight the role of underwriters and direct regulatory enforcement in maintaining disclosure levels when investor demand is low.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3153143","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper examines how credit rating levels affect municipal debt issuers’ disclosure decisions. Using exogenous upgrades in credit rating levels caused by the recalibration of Moody's municipal ratings scale in 2010, we find that upgraded municipalities significantly reduce their disclosure of required continuing financial information, relative to unaffected municipalities. Consistent with a reduction in debtholders’ demand for information driving these results, the reduction in disclosure is greater when municipal bonds are held by investors who relied more on disclosure ex ante. However, we also find that the reduction in disclosure does not manifest when issuers are monitored by underwriters with greater issuer‐specific expertise and when issuers are subject to direct regulatory enforcement through the receipt of federal funding. Overall, our results suggest that higher credit rating levels lower investor demand for disclosure in the municipal market, and highlight the role of underwriters and direct regulatory enforcement in maintaining disclosure levels when investor demand is low.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
信用评级对信息披露的影响:来自穆迪市政评级重新校准的证据
本文考察了信用评级水平对市政债券发行人披露决策的影响。利用2010年穆迪市政评级规模重新校准导致的信用评级水平的外生升级,我们发现,相对于未受影响的城市,升级的城市显著减少了所需持续财务信息的披露。与债券持有人对推动这些结果的信息需求减少一致,当市政债券由更依赖事先披露的投资者持有时,披露的减少更大。然而,我们还发现,当发行人受到具有更多发行人特定专业知识的承销商的监督时,以及发行人通过接受联邦资金而受到直接监管执法时,披露的减少并不明显。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,较高的信用评级水平降低了市政市场投资者对披露的需求,并强调了当投资者需求较低时,承销商和直接监管执法在维持披露水平方面的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Heterogeneous-Agent Asset Pricing The Effects of Transparency on OTC Market-Making Online Appendix for: 'Obfuscation in Mutual Funds' Vertical Control Financial Fragility with SAM?
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1