Shengyi Pan, Jiayuan Zhou, F. R. Côgo, Xin Xia, Lingfeng Bao, Xing Hu, Shanping Li, Ahmed E. Hassan
{"title":"Automated unearthing of dangerous issue reports","authors":"Shengyi Pan, Jiayuan Zhou, F. R. Côgo, Xin Xia, Lingfeng Bao, Xing Hu, Shanping Li, Ahmed E. Hassan","doi":"10.1145/3540250.3549156","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) process is commonly adopted for open source software (OSS) vulnerability management, which suggests to privately report the discovered vulnerabilities and keep relevant information secret until the official disclosure. However, in practice, due to various reasons (e.g., lacking security domain expertise or the sense of security management), many vulnerabilities are first reported via public issue reports (IRs) before its official disclosure. Such IRs are dangerous IRs, since attackers can take advantages of the leaked vulnerability information to launch zero-day attacks. It is crucial to identify such dangerous IRs at an early stage, such that OSS users can start the vulnerability remediation process earlier and OSS maintainers can timely manage the dangerous IRs. In this paper, we propose and evaluate a deep learning based approach, namely MemVul, to automatically identify dangerous IRs at the time they are reported. MemVul augments the neural networks with a memory component, which stores the external vulnerability knowledge from Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). We rely on publicly accessible CVE-referred IRs (CIRs) to operationalize the concept of dangerous IR. We mine 3,937 CIRs distributed across 1,390 OSS projects hosted on GitHub. Evaluated under a practical scenario of high data imbalance, MemVul achieves the best trade-off between precision and recall among all baselines. In particular, the F1-score of MemVul (i.e., 0.49) improves the best performing baseline by 44%. For IRs that are predicted as CIRs but not reported to CVE, we conduct a user study to investigate their usefulness to OSS stakeholders. We observe that 82% (41 out of 50) of these IRs are security-related and 28 of them are suggested by security experts to be publicly disclosed, indicating MemVul is capable of identifying undisclosed dangerous IRs.","PeriodicalId":68155,"journal":{"name":"软件产业与工程","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"软件产业与工程","FirstCategoryId":"1089","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3540250.3549156","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
The coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) process is commonly adopted for open source software (OSS) vulnerability management, which suggests to privately report the discovered vulnerabilities and keep relevant information secret until the official disclosure. However, in practice, due to various reasons (e.g., lacking security domain expertise or the sense of security management), many vulnerabilities are first reported via public issue reports (IRs) before its official disclosure. Such IRs are dangerous IRs, since attackers can take advantages of the leaked vulnerability information to launch zero-day attacks. It is crucial to identify such dangerous IRs at an early stage, such that OSS users can start the vulnerability remediation process earlier and OSS maintainers can timely manage the dangerous IRs. In this paper, we propose and evaluate a deep learning based approach, namely MemVul, to automatically identify dangerous IRs at the time they are reported. MemVul augments the neural networks with a memory component, which stores the external vulnerability knowledge from Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). We rely on publicly accessible CVE-referred IRs (CIRs) to operationalize the concept of dangerous IR. We mine 3,937 CIRs distributed across 1,390 OSS projects hosted on GitHub. Evaluated under a practical scenario of high data imbalance, MemVul achieves the best trade-off between precision and recall among all baselines. In particular, the F1-score of MemVul (i.e., 0.49) improves the best performing baseline by 44%. For IRs that are predicted as CIRs but not reported to CVE, we conduct a user study to investigate their usefulness to OSS stakeholders. We observe that 82% (41 out of 50) of these IRs are security-related and 28 of them are suggested by security experts to be publicly disclosed, indicating MemVul is capable of identifying undisclosed dangerous IRs.