{"title":"Insurgent Armies: Military Obedience and State Formation after Rebel Victory","authors":"Philip A. Martin","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00427","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why do some winning rebel groups build obedient and effective state militaries after civil war, while others suffer military defections? When winning rebels face intense security threats during civil wars, rebel field commanders are more likely to remain obedient during war-to-peace transitions. Intense security threats incentivize militants to create more inclusive leadership structures, reducing field commanders’ incentives to defect in the postwar period. Intense security threats also reduce commanders’ capacity for postwar resistance by forcing insurgents to remain mobile and adopt shorter time horizons in rebel-governed territory, reducing the likelihood that field commanders will develop local ties and independent support bases. The plausibility of the argument is examined using a new list of winning rebel groups since 1946. Two case studies—Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire—probe the causal mechanisms of the theory. The study contributes to debates about the consequences of military victory in civil war, the postwar trajectories of armed groups, and the conditions necessary for civil-military cohesion in fragile states.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"80 1","pages":"87-127"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8000,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Security","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00427","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
Abstract Why do some winning rebel groups build obedient and effective state militaries after civil war, while others suffer military defections? When winning rebels face intense security threats during civil wars, rebel field commanders are more likely to remain obedient during war-to-peace transitions. Intense security threats incentivize militants to create more inclusive leadership structures, reducing field commanders’ incentives to defect in the postwar period. Intense security threats also reduce commanders’ capacity for postwar resistance by forcing insurgents to remain mobile and adopt shorter time horizons in rebel-governed territory, reducing the likelihood that field commanders will develop local ties and independent support bases. The plausibility of the argument is examined using a new list of winning rebel groups since 1946. Two case studies—Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire—probe the causal mechanisms of the theory. The study contributes to debates about the consequences of military victory in civil war, the postwar trajectories of armed groups, and the conditions necessary for civil-military cohesion in fragile states.
期刊介绍:
International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies.
International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends.
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