Antitrust in Attention Markets: Definition, Power, Harm

J. Newman
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Despite its vital role in the modern marketplace, attention has largely escaped the notice of the antitrust community. Existing discourse exhibits a variety of misconceptions and flawed prescriptions. One example is the widely held notion that attention markets necessitate two-sided platform analysis. Another is a marked overemphasis on data-collection practices. Yet another is that human users, viewers, and listeners are “the consumers” in these markets. And a fourth is that competition for attention occurs within one massive relevant market, obviating the possibility that any single firm could exercise market power. In light of nascent enforcement actions against Facebook, Google, and others, these defects require correction. This Article begins by explaining the basic economics of attention markets, which often involve zero-price barter transactions. It turns next to the appropriate antitrust methodology for market definition. Attention markets need not encompass two “sides”; instead, they are best understood as traditional top-down distribution systems. The oft-used SSNIP test is facially unworkable in zero-price attention markets, but the SSNIC or SSNDQ variants may offer some utility. Practical indicia will often be more useful, however, given the unwieldy nature of hypothetical-monopolist tests. Regardless of methodology, courts and enforcers should take care to avoid the “massive market” fallacy espoused by some commentators. As to market power, both market shares and direct evidence can be useful. The three most common methods for assigning shares—time on-site, active users, and advertising revenues—can each shed light on the issue. Wherever available, direct evidence on attention-cost changes and competitive responses (or lack thereof) should play a significant role. Turning to anticompetitive effects, the “attention overcharge” should be a core concern. Recent litigation efforts have framed this harm instead as “lower quality,” an approach that will often be suboptimal. Finally, competition for attention can lead to overuse, overconsumption, heightened racial and gender animus, and other societal ills. In response, courts and enforcement agencies should extend leniency to certain attention-related conduct that might initially appear harmful.
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注意力市场中的反垄断:定义、权力、危害
尽管它在现代市场中发挥着至关重要的作用,但人们对它的关注在很大程度上没有引起反垄断界的注意。现有的话语表现出各种各样的误解和有缺陷的处方。一个例子是,人们普遍认为注意力市场需要双边平台分析。另一个是过分强调数据收集的做法。还有一个原因是,人类用户、观众和听众都是这些市场中的“消费者”。第四点是,争夺注意力的竞争发生在一个巨大的相关市场内,这就排除了任何一家公司行使市场支配力的可能性。鉴于针对Facebook、b谷歌和其他公司的初步执法行动,这些缺陷需要纠正。本文首先解释注意力市场的基本经济学,它通常涉及零价格易货交易。接下来是市场定义的适当反垄断方法。注意力市场不需要包含两个“方面”;相反,它们最好被理解为传统的自上而下的分配系统。通常使用的SSNIP测试在零价格注意力市场上表面上是不可用的,但是SSNIC或SSNDQ变体可能提供一些实用程序。然而,考虑到假设垄断者测试的笨拙性质,实际的指标往往会更有用。无论采用何种方法,法院和执法者都应注意避免某些评论员所支持的“大规模市场”谬论。至于市场力量,市场份额和直接证据都是有用的。分配份额的三种最常见的方法——站点时间、活跃用户和广告收入——都可以解释这个问题。只要有证据,关于注意力成本变化和竞争性反应(或缺乏)的直接证据应该发挥重要作用。至于反竞争效应,“注意力过度收费”应该是一个核心问题。最近的诉讼努力将这种危害定义为“低质量”,这种方法通常是次优的。最后,争夺注意力可能导致过度使用、过度消费、加剧种族和性别敌意,以及其他社会弊病。作为回应,法院和执法机构应对某些最初可能看起来有害的与注意力有关的行为予以宽大处理。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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