Presidents, Politics, and Military Strategy: Electoral Constraints during the Iraq War

IF 4.8 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS International Security Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.1162/isec_a_00371
A. Payne
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引用次数: 10

Abstract

Abstract How do electoral politics affect presidential decisionmaking in war? As both commander in chief and elected officeholder, presidents must inevitably balance competing objectives of the national interest and political survival when assessing alternative military strategies in war. Yet, how and when electoral pressures influence decisionmaking during an ongoing conflict remains unclear. Drawn from the logic of democratic accountability, two mechanisms of constraint may be inferred. First, presidents may delay making decisions that are perceived to carry excessive electoral risk. Second, electoral pressures may have a dampening effect, causing presidents to water down politically sensitive courses of action to minimize any expected backlash. Recently declassified documents and interviews with senior administration officials and military figures illustrate these mechanisms in a case study of decisionmaking during the second half of the Iraq War. Both George W. Bush's surge decision of 2007 and Barack Obama's decision to withdraw troops in 2011 are shown to have been profoundly influenced by concerns related to the domestic political calendar. These findings call for further study of the nuanced ways in which the electoral cycle shapes wartime decisionmaking.
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总统、政治和军事战略:伊拉克战争期间的选举限制
战争中选举政治如何影响总统决策?作为总司令和民选公职人员,总统在评估战争中的其他军事战略时,不可避免地必须平衡国家利益和政治生存这两个相互竞争的目标。然而,在持续冲突期间,选举压力如何以及何时影响决策仍不清楚。根据民主问责的逻辑,可以推断出两种约束机制。首先,总统可能会推迟做出被认为会带来过度选举风险的决定。其次,选举压力可能会产生抑制作用,导致总统淡化政治敏感的行动方案,以尽量减少任何预期的反弹。最近解密的文件和对高级政府官员和军事人物的采访,在伊拉克战争后半段的决策案例研究中说明了这些机制。乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush) 2007年增兵的决定和巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama) 2011年撤军的决定都受到了与国内政治日程相关的担忧的深刻影响。这些发现需要进一步研究选举周期影响战时决策的微妙方式。
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来源期刊
International Security
International Security Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
7.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies. International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends. Readers of IS discover new developments in: The causes and prevention of war U.S.-China relations Great power politics Ethnic conflict and intra-state war Terrorism and insurgency Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America U.S. foreign and defense policy International relations theory Diplomatic and military history Cybersecurity and defense technology Political economy, business, and security Nuclear proliferation.
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