{"title":"Endogenous and costly institutional deterrence in a public good experiment","authors":"David C. Kingsley , Thomas C. Brown","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2016.03.005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Modern societies rely on formal, central authority institutions that regulate the behavior of all members of society. This paper investigates the formation of a central authority regime within a linear public good experiment. The institution is funded by a fixed cost that increases with the level of deterrence, which is specified as the number of group members who are likely to be monitored. The level of deterrence is both exogenously and endogenously determined, allowing investigation of the effect of endogenous selection. The results indicate no significant positive endogenous selection effect. Indeed, in contrast to the existing literature, when a non-deterrent central authority is endogenously determined contributions tend to decrease.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"62 ","pages":"Pages 33-41"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.socec.2016.03.005","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804316300131","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
Modern societies rely on formal, central authority institutions that regulate the behavior of all members of society. This paper investigates the formation of a central authority regime within a linear public good experiment. The institution is funded by a fixed cost that increases with the level of deterrence, which is specified as the number of group members who are likely to be monitored. The level of deterrence is both exogenously and endogenously determined, allowing investigation of the effect of endogenous selection. The results indicate no significant positive endogenous selection effect. Indeed, in contrast to the existing literature, when a non-deterrent central authority is endogenously determined contributions tend to decrease.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.