Spatial price discrimination with a ‘must-have’ component

IF 3.5 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Regional Science and Urban Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2023.103958
John S. Heywood , Qiming Luo , Guangliang Ye
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Abstract

An upstream firm provides a valuable component with either an exclusive or nonexclusive contract to two downstream firms on a horizontal market. The downstream firms engage in either uniform pricing or spatial price discrimination. The component provider is more likely to sign an exclusive contract under discriminatory pricing. Discriminatory pricing generates higher welfare when both pricing methods result in exclusive contracts and generates the same welfare when both methods result in nonexclusive contracts. Importantly it generates lower welfare when discriminatory pricing results in exclusive contracts and uniform pricing results in nonexclusive contracts. These results prove robust to a variety of model variations.

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带有“必备”成分的空间价格歧视
在横向市场上,上游企业通过排他性或非排他性合同向两个下游企业提供有价值的组成部分。下游企业要么实行统一定价,要么实行空间价格歧视。在歧视性定价下,零部件供应商更有可能签订排他性合同。当两种定价方法都产生排他性合同时,歧视性定价产生更高的福利;当两种定价方法都产生非排他性合同时,歧视性定价产生相同的福利。重要的是,当歧视性定价导致排他性合同和统一定价导致非排他性合同时,它会产生较低的福利。这些结果证明了对各种模型变化的鲁棒性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.30
自引率
9.70%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: Regional Science and Urban Economics facilitates and encourages high-quality scholarship on important issues in regional and urban economics. It publishes significant contributions that are theoretical or empirical, positive or normative. It solicits original papers with a spatial dimension that can be of interest to economists. Empirical papers studying causal mechanisms are expected to propose a convincing identification strategy.
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