Autobiographical memory and the self: A transition theory perspective.

Abstract

In contrast to much theoretical work on the topic, Transition Theory (Brown, 2016, 2021) attempts to account for important aspects of autobiographical memory in a way that emphasizes the structure of experience, rather than the relation between personal-event memories and the Self. This article provides the rationale for adopting this minimalist stance. Here it is argued that: (a) an all-inclusive notion of the Self is of little utility to the study of autobiographical memory because virtually all sentient goal-directed activities can be seen as reflecting the Self, hence, adopting this view provides no bias for predicting event memorability; (b) although some event memories are clearly Self-relevant (e.g., life-story events, turning points, self-defining memories), most are not; (c) the formation of and access to Self-knowledge typically does not depend on the availability of specific autobiographical memories; rather, (d) Self-knowledge is generally derived from massive amounts of readily forgotten role-relevant experience. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Representation Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief Psychology > Memory.