黑盒作为经济游戏中基于回报学习的控制工具。

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS Games Pub Date : 2022-11-16 DOI:10.3390/g13060076
Maxwell N Burton-Chellew, Stuart A West
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引用次数: 0

摘要

黑盒子方法是作为一种 "非社会控制 "而开发的,它允许在重复的公共产品游戏中进行基于回报的学习,同时消除社会反应。游戏者被告知,他们必须决定向一个虚拟黑盒投入多少虚拟硬币,黑盒将提供不确定的回报。但实际上,他们是在重复的社交游戏中相互博弈。通过 "黑箱 "游戏的社会方面和回报结构,该方法创造了一群自利但无知或困惑的个体,他们必须学习游戏的回报。相对于理性自利行为主体(经济人)的理论预测,这种剔除了社会因素的低信息环境为测试社会行为提供了另一种根据经验得出的无效假设。然而,一个潜在的问题是,参与者可能会在不知不觉中影响其他参与者的学习。在此,我们通过让参与者在不知情的情况下与模拟参与者("电脑黑盒")互动,在一系列公益游戏中测试了解决这一问题的方法。我们发现原始黑盒和电脑黑盒的学习率没有明显差异,因此这两种方法都可以用来研究游戏中的学习。这些结果以及模拟代理可以通过编程以不同方式进行行为的事实,意味着电脑黑盒在补充研究个人和群体如何在不同环境下学习社会困境方面具有巨大潜力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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The Black Box as a Control for Payoff-Based Learning in Economic Games.

The black box method was developed as an "asocial control" to allow for payoff-based learning while eliminating social responses in repeated public goods games. Players are told they must decide how many virtual coins they want to input into a virtual black box that will provide uncertain returns. However, in truth, they are playing with each other in a repeated social game. By "black boxing" the game's social aspects and payoff structure, the method creates a population of self-interested but ignorant or confused individuals that must learn the game's payoffs. This low-information environment, stripped of social concerns, provides an alternative, empirically derived null hypothesis for testing social behaviours, as opposed to the theoretical predictions of rational self-interested agents (Homo economicus). However, a potential problem is that participants can unwittingly affect the learning of other participants. Here, we test a solution to this problem in a range of public goods games by making participants interact, unknowingly, with simulated players ("computerised black box"). We find no significant differences in rates of learning between the original and the computerised black box, therefore either method can be used to investigate learning in games. These results, along with the fact that simulated agents can be programmed to behave in different ways, mean that the computerised black box has great potential for complementing studies of how individuals and groups learn under different environments in social dilemmas.

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来源期刊
Games
Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
65
审稿时长
11 weeks
期刊介绍: Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.
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