{"title":"为什么运动想象不是真正的运动:从基于效果的行动控制角度重新认识运动想象。","authors":"Patric Bach, Cornelia Frank, Wilfried Kunde","doi":"10.1007/s00426-022-01773-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Overt and imagined action seem inextricably linked. Both have similar timing, activate shared brain circuits, and motor imagery influences overt action and vice versa. Motor imagery is, therefore, often assumed to recruit the same motor processes that govern action execution, and which allow one to play through or simulate actions offline. Here, we advance a very different conceptualization. Accordingly, the links between imagery and overt action do not arise because action imagery is intrinsically motoric, but because action planning is intrinsically imaginistic and occurs in terms of the perceptual effects one want to achieve. Seen like this, the term 'motor imagery' is a misnomer of what is more appropriately portrayed as 'effect imagery'. In this article, we review the long-standing arguments for effect-based accounts of action, which are often ignored in motor imagery research. We show that such views provide a straightforward account of motor imagery. We review the evidence for imagery-execution overlaps through this new lens and argue that they indeed emerge because every action we execute is planned, initiated and controlled through an imagery-like process. We highlight findings that this new view can now explain and point out open questions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48184,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung","volume":" ","pages":"1790-1804"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11315751/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why motor imagery is not really motoric: towards a re-conceptualization in terms of effect-based action control.\",\"authors\":\"Patric Bach, Cornelia Frank, Wilfried Kunde\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00426-022-01773-w\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Overt and imagined action seem inextricably linked. Both have similar timing, activate shared brain circuits, and motor imagery influences overt action and vice versa. Motor imagery is, therefore, often assumed to recruit the same motor processes that govern action execution, and which allow one to play through or simulate actions offline. Here, we advance a very different conceptualization. Accordingly, the links between imagery and overt action do not arise because action imagery is intrinsically motoric, but because action planning is intrinsically imaginistic and occurs in terms of the perceptual effects one want to achieve. Seen like this, the term 'motor imagery' is a misnomer of what is more appropriately portrayed as 'effect imagery'. In this article, we review the long-standing arguments for effect-based accounts of action, which are often ignored in motor imagery research. We show that such views provide a straightforward account of motor imagery. We review the evidence for imagery-execution overlaps through this new lens and argue that they indeed emerge because every action we execute is planned, initiated and controlled through an imagery-like process. We highlight findings that this new view can now explain and point out open questions.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48184,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"1790-1804\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11315751/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-022-01773-w\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2022/12/14 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-022-01773-w","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2022/12/14 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
Why motor imagery is not really motoric: towards a re-conceptualization in terms of effect-based action control.
Overt and imagined action seem inextricably linked. Both have similar timing, activate shared brain circuits, and motor imagery influences overt action and vice versa. Motor imagery is, therefore, often assumed to recruit the same motor processes that govern action execution, and which allow one to play through or simulate actions offline. Here, we advance a very different conceptualization. Accordingly, the links between imagery and overt action do not arise because action imagery is intrinsically motoric, but because action planning is intrinsically imaginistic and occurs in terms of the perceptual effects one want to achieve. Seen like this, the term 'motor imagery' is a misnomer of what is more appropriately portrayed as 'effect imagery'. In this article, we review the long-standing arguments for effect-based accounts of action, which are often ignored in motor imagery research. We show that such views provide a straightforward account of motor imagery. We review the evidence for imagery-execution overlaps through this new lens and argue that they indeed emerge because every action we execute is planned, initiated and controlled through an imagery-like process. We highlight findings that this new view can now explain and point out open questions.
期刊介绍:
Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung publishes articles that contribute to a basic understanding of human perception, attention, memory, and action. The Journal is devoted to the dissemination of knowledge based on firm experimental ground, but not to particular approaches or schools of thought. Theoretical and historical papers are welcome to the extent that they serve this general purpose; papers of an applied nature are acceptable if they contribute to basic understanding or serve to bridge the often felt gap between basic and applied research in the field covered by the Journal.