{"title":"“像我们一样的未来”的论点能经受住本体论的审视吗?","authors":"Matthew Adams, Nicholas Rimell","doi":"10.1093/jmp/jhab033","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We argue that the future-like-ours argument against abortion rests on an important assumption. Namely, in the first trimester of an aborted pregnancy, there exists something that would have gone on to enjoy conscious mental states, had the abortion not occurred. To accommodate this assumption, we argue, a proponent of the future-like-ours argument must presuppose that there is ontic vagueness. We anticipate the objection that our argument achieves \"too much\" because it also applies mutatis mutandis to conscious humans. We respond by showing that an explanation can be given for why it is wrong to kill conscious humans that is independent of the underlying metaphysics. Our response brings into focus a reason why-at least in the context of an ethical argument like the future-like-ours argument-appeal to a highly controversial metaphysics is ad hoc. Such metaphysics is not necessary to explain the wrongness of killing conscious humans, only nonconscious fetuses.</p>","PeriodicalId":47377,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","volume":"47 5","pages":"667-680"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Can the Future-Like-Ours Argument Survive Ontological Scrutiny?\",\"authors\":\"Matthew Adams, Nicholas Rimell\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/jmp/jhab033\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>We argue that the future-like-ours argument against abortion rests on an important assumption. Namely, in the first trimester of an aborted pregnancy, there exists something that would have gone on to enjoy conscious mental states, had the abortion not occurred. To accommodate this assumption, we argue, a proponent of the future-like-ours argument must presuppose that there is ontic vagueness. We anticipate the objection that our argument achieves \\\"too much\\\" because it also applies mutatis mutandis to conscious humans. We respond by showing that an explanation can be given for why it is wrong to kill conscious humans that is independent of the underlying metaphysics. Our response brings into focus a reason why-at least in the context of an ethical argument like the future-like-ours argument-appeal to a highly controversial metaphysics is ad hoc. Such metaphysics is not necessary to explain the wrongness of killing conscious humans, only nonconscious fetuses.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47377,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"47 5\",\"pages\":\"667-680\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"3\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhab033\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Medicine and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhab033","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Can the Future-Like-Ours Argument Survive Ontological Scrutiny?
We argue that the future-like-ours argument against abortion rests on an important assumption. Namely, in the first trimester of an aborted pregnancy, there exists something that would have gone on to enjoy conscious mental states, had the abortion not occurred. To accommodate this assumption, we argue, a proponent of the future-like-ours argument must presuppose that there is ontic vagueness. We anticipate the objection that our argument achieves "too much" because it also applies mutatis mutandis to conscious humans. We respond by showing that an explanation can be given for why it is wrong to kill conscious humans that is independent of the underlying metaphysics. Our response brings into focus a reason why-at least in the context of an ethical argument like the future-like-ours argument-appeal to a highly controversial metaphysics is ad hoc. Such metaphysics is not necessary to explain the wrongness of killing conscious humans, only nonconscious fetuses.
期刊介绍:
This bimonthly publication explores the shared themes and concerns of philosophy and the medical sciences. Central issues in medical research and practice have important philosophical dimensions, for, in treating disease and promoting health, medicine involves presuppositions about human goals and values. Conversely, the concerns of philosophy often significantly relate to those of medicine, as philosophers seek to understand the nature of medical knowledge and the human condition in the modern world. In addition, recent developments in medical technology and treatment create moral problems that raise important philosophical questions. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy aims to provide an ongoing forum for the discussion of such themes and issues.