“像我们一样的未来”的论点能经受住本体论的审视吗?

IF 1.3 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-11-21 DOI:10.1093/jmp/jhab033
Matthew Adams, Nicholas Rimell
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们认为,未来和我们反对堕胎的论点一样,建立在一个重要的假设之上。也就是说,在流产后的前三个月,如果没有流产,存在一些东西会继续享受有意识的精神状态。为了适应这一假设,我们认为,“未来-像我们的论点”的支持者必须假设存在本体模糊性。我们预料到有人会反对我们的论证“做得太多了”,因为它也同样适用于有意识的人类。我们的回应是,可以给出一个独立于潜在形而上学的解释,来解释为什么杀死有意识的人类是错误的。我们的回答让我们注意到一个原因,为什么——至少在像未来这样的伦理争论的背景下——像我们的争论一样——诉诸高度争议的形而上学是特别的。这样的形而上学并不能解释杀死有意识的人类的错误,只有杀死无意识的胎儿才是错误的。
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Can the Future-Like-Ours Argument Survive Ontological Scrutiny?

We argue that the future-like-ours argument against abortion rests on an important assumption. Namely, in the first trimester of an aborted pregnancy, there exists something that would have gone on to enjoy conscious mental states, had the abortion not occurred. To accommodate this assumption, we argue, a proponent of the future-like-ours argument must presuppose that there is ontic vagueness. We anticipate the objection that our argument achieves "too much" because it also applies mutatis mutandis to conscious humans. We respond by showing that an explanation can be given for why it is wrong to kill conscious humans that is independent of the underlying metaphysics. Our response brings into focus a reason why-at least in the context of an ethical argument like the future-like-ours argument-appeal to a highly controversial metaphysics is ad hoc. Such metaphysics is not necessary to explain the wrongness of killing conscious humans, only nonconscious fetuses.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
6.20%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: This bimonthly publication explores the shared themes and concerns of philosophy and the medical sciences. Central issues in medical research and practice have important philosophical dimensions, for, in treating disease and promoting health, medicine involves presuppositions about human goals and values. Conversely, the concerns of philosophy often significantly relate to those of medicine, as philosophers seek to understand the nature of medical knowledge and the human condition in the modern world. In addition, recent developments in medical technology and treatment create moral problems that raise important philosophical questions. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy aims to provide an ongoing forum for the discussion of such themes and issues.
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