银行董事会为什么要设立风险委员会?

René M. Stulz, James G. Tompkins, Rohan Williamson, Z. Ye
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们发展了银行董事会风险委员会的理论。根据这一理论,即使没有预期如果银行有一个运作良好的风险委员会,银行风险就会降低,这样的委员会也是有价值的。正如我们的理论所预测的(1)在多德-弗兰克法案强制要求资产超过100亿美元的银行控股公司设立董事会风险委员会之前,许多大型和复杂的银行自愿选择设立风险委员会,(2)建立董事会风险委员会并不能平均降低银行的风险。使用独特的访谈数据,我们表明风险委员会的工作与我们的理论部分一致。
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Why Do Bank Boards Have Risk Committees?
We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a risk committee before the Dodd-Frank Act forced bank holding companies with assets in excess of $10 billion to have a board risk committee, and (2) establishing a board risk committee does not reduce a bank’s risk on average. Using unique interview data, we show that the work of risk committees is consistent with our theory in part.
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