{"title":"具有内生外部选项的劳动力搜索","authors":"Ritesh Jain, Srinivasan Murali","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3678453","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We incorporate the extended version of Nash bargaining proposed by Vartiainen (2007) in a standard labour search and matching model to endogenously determine the outside option of workers along with their wages. We find that the optimal outside option of a worker under this framework is zero and this equilibrium maximizes social welfare when the economy is constrained efficient.<br>","PeriodicalId":120099,"journal":{"name":"Economic Anthropology eJournal","volume":"37 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Labour Search with Endogenous Outside Option\",\"authors\":\"Ritesh Jain, Srinivasan Murali\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3678453\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We incorporate the extended version of Nash bargaining proposed by Vartiainen (2007) in a standard labour search and matching model to endogenously determine the outside option of workers along with their wages. We find that the optimal outside option of a worker under this framework is zero and this equilibrium maximizes social welfare when the economy is constrained efficient.<br>\",\"PeriodicalId\":120099,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economic Anthropology eJournal\",\"volume\":\"37 6\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-08-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economic Anthropology eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3678453\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Anthropology eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3678453","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We incorporate the extended version of Nash bargaining proposed by Vartiainen (2007) in a standard labour search and matching model to endogenously determine the outside option of workers along with their wages. We find that the optimal outside option of a worker under this framework is zero and this equilibrium maximizes social welfare when the economy is constrained efficient.
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