闪存中激光诱导的单比特故障:32位微控制器上的指令损坏

Brice Colombier, A. Menu, J. Dutertre, Pierre-Alain Moëllic, J. Rigaud, J. Danger
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引用次数: 47

摘要

物理攻击是针对安全嵌入式系统的已知威胁。其中值得注意的是激光故障注入技术,它通常被认为是最有效的故障注入技术。事实上,激光故障注入提供了很高的空间精度,这使得攻击者能够诱导比特级故障。然而,从攻击8位目标中获得的经验可能与更高级的微架构无关,并且这些攻击在32位微控制器上变得越来越具有挑战性。在本文中,我们证明了32位微控制器的闪存区域对激光故障注入敏感。这些错误发生在指令获取过程中,因此存储的值保持不变。在对诱发故障和相关故障模型进行了彻底的描述之后,我们提供了位级指令损坏的详细示例,并演示了在危及现实代码安全性方面的实际应用。基于这些实验结果,我们提出了一个关于潜在微结构特征的假设,以解释观察到的断层模型。
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Laser-induced Single-bit Faults in Flash Memory: Instructions Corruption on a 32-bit Microcontroller
Physical attacks are a known threat posed against secure embedded systems. Notable among these is laser fault injection, which is often considered as the most effective fault injection technique. Indeed, laser fault injection provides a high spatial accuracy, which enables an attacker to induce bit-level faults. However, experience gained from attacking 8-bit targets might not be relevant on more advanced micro-architectures, and these attacks become increasingly challenging on 32-bit microcontrollers. In this article, we show that the flash memory area of a 32-bit microcontroller is sensitive to laser fault injection. These faults occur during the instruction fetch process, hence the stored value remains unaltered. After a thorough characterisation of the induced faults and the associated fault model, we provide detailed examples of bit-level corruption of instructions and demonstrate practical applications in compromising the security of real-life codes. Based on these experimental results, we formulate a hypothesis about the underlying micro-architectural features that explain the observed fault model.
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