{"title":"共享系统中的多玩家博弈模型与混合策略分析","authors":"Mingyuan Yu, Qian Li, Zhou Wu","doi":"10.1109/ISPCE-CN48734.2019.8958629","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Arising from the rapid development of the sharing system, this paper proposed a three-player game model that considers government, enterprises, and consumers as the main body. Meanwhile, we carried out equilibrium analysis for each player in the model to maximize their profits. We found that enterprise decision-making is a key factor in the profit of the government and consumers, while consumer’s profit is only positively related to his own decision-making. Results show that there exists no pure NE, all players only could decide their participation rates according to others’ probability of participation. Finally, the case implied that the (non-regulation, maintenance, non-supervision) maybe an optimal mixed strategy to maximize all the players’ profits.","PeriodicalId":221535,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Product Compliance Engineering - Asia (ISPCE-CN)","volume":"197 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Multi-player Game Model and Mixed Strategy Analysis in Sharing System\",\"authors\":\"Mingyuan Yu, Qian Li, Zhou Wu\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ISPCE-CN48734.2019.8958629\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Arising from the rapid development of the sharing system, this paper proposed a three-player game model that considers government, enterprises, and consumers as the main body. Meanwhile, we carried out equilibrium analysis for each player in the model to maximize their profits. We found that enterprise decision-making is a key factor in the profit of the government and consumers, while consumer’s profit is only positively related to his own decision-making. Results show that there exists no pure NE, all players only could decide their participation rates according to others’ probability of participation. Finally, the case implied that the (non-regulation, maintenance, non-supervision) maybe an optimal mixed strategy to maximize all the players’ profits.\",\"PeriodicalId\":221535,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 IEEE Symposium on Product Compliance Engineering - Asia (ISPCE-CN)\",\"volume\":\"197 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 IEEE Symposium on Product Compliance Engineering - Asia (ISPCE-CN)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ISPCE-CN48734.2019.8958629\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Product Compliance Engineering - Asia (ISPCE-CN)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ISPCE-CN48734.2019.8958629","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Multi-player Game Model and Mixed Strategy Analysis in Sharing System
Arising from the rapid development of the sharing system, this paper proposed a three-player game model that considers government, enterprises, and consumers as the main body. Meanwhile, we carried out equilibrium analysis for each player in the model to maximize their profits. We found that enterprise decision-making is a key factor in the profit of the government and consumers, while consumer’s profit is only positively related to his own decision-making. Results show that there exists no pure NE, all players only could decide their participation rates according to others’ probability of participation. Finally, the case implied that the (non-regulation, maintenance, non-supervision) maybe an optimal mixed strategy to maximize all the players’ profits.