可信监视器:基于tee的系统监视

Benedikt Jung, Christian Eichler, Jonas Röckl, R. Schlenk, Timo Hönig, Tilo Müller
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引用次数: 1

摘要

随着可信计算变得越来越重要,可信执行环境(tee)得到了更广泛的应用。在关键基础设施中的嵌入式系统环境中,对安全性的要求特别高。我们提出了一种称为可信监视器(TM)的新型入侵检测系统,即使在系统级攻击者存在的情况下,它也可以通过在ARM TrustZone TEE内运行来保护其完整性。TM使用硬件性能计数器持续监控系统,并通过特定于应用程序的机器学习模型基于分类检测入侵。我们的评估表明,TM对183个评估工作负载中的86%进行了正确分类,而性能开销保持在2%以下。特别是,我们展示了一个真实的内核级rootkit可以明显地影响硬件性能计数器,因此可以被检测到。
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Trusted Monitor: TEE-Based System Monitoring
As trusted computing becomes increasingly important, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) see more widespread use. A particular high demand for security arises in the context of embedded systems in critical infrastructures. We present a novel intrusion detection system called the Trusted Monitor (TM) that protects its integrity even in the presence of a system-level attacker by running inside the ARM TrustZone TEE. The TM constantly monitors the system using hardware performance counters and detects intrusions based on the classification by an application-specific machine learning model. Our evaluation shows that the TM correctly classifies 86% of 183 evaluated workloads, while the performance overhead stays below 2%. In particular, we show that a real-world kernel-level rootkit observably influences the hardware performance counters and, thus, can be detected.
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