{"title":"移民与英国:脱欧后的反思","authors":"M. Alfano, C. Dustmann, T. Frattini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2900373","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The recent referendum in the UK on membership of the EU has sent shockwaves across the political establishment not just in the UK itself and throughout Europe, but also around the world. In the runup to the referendum, economists were (perhaps for the first time) united in pointing out that the economic case for Brexit is rather slim, that hardly any well-argued reason could be given by the Brexit camp as to why it may be a good idea to leave the EU, and that the economic consequences could be severe. That lack of economic argument in favour of Brexit, which should have been the key battleground in the run up to the referendum, led the debate to focus on one particular issue, Immigration. Like the free movement of goods, capital, and services, a fundamental pillar of the EU, and a non-negotiable requirement for any new member state, is the free movement of people. It is that particular aspect of EU membership that became the strongest single assertion of the Brexit camp. The inability to control immigration f m within the EU was made a symbol for everything else Brexit stood for (such as the idea of “sovereignty†or the pain of being subjugated to “rules made in Brussels and not the UK†), but – again – fact-based arguments against free mobility on economic or welfare grounds were hard to find. Nevertheless, free mobility within the EU became quickly the scapegoat for the economic and social woes that had distressed the country since the great recession, and perhaps even earlier, such as crime, real wage decline, inequality, unemployment, access to social services, health provision, and benefits and transfers. “Immigration†and everything people associated with it and were encouraged to believe by a relentless campaign of the majority of the tabloid press decisively contributed to the decision that the UK took on June 23, 2016. Immigration and free mobility will likely again be central in the negotiations between the UK and its European partners in developing a model for Brexit that minimises the economic costs fo both the UK and the EU.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"26","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Immigration and the UK: Reflections after Brexit\",\"authors\":\"M. Alfano, C. Dustmann, T. Frattini\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2900373\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The recent referendum in the UK on membership of the EU has sent shockwaves across the political establishment not just in the UK itself and throughout Europe, but also around the world. In the runup to the referendum, economists were (perhaps for the first time) united in pointing out that the economic case for Brexit is rather slim, that hardly any well-argued reason could be given by the Brexit camp as to why it may be a good idea to leave the EU, and that the economic consequences could be severe. That lack of economic argument in favour of Brexit, which should have been the key battleground in the run up to the referendum, led the debate to focus on one particular issue, Immigration. Like the free movement of goods, capital, and services, a fundamental pillar of the EU, and a non-negotiable requirement for any new member state, is the free movement of people. It is that particular aspect of EU membership that became the strongest single assertion of the Brexit camp. The inability to control immigration f m within the EU was made a symbol for everything else Brexit stood for (such as the idea of “sovereignty†or the pain of being subjugated to “rules made in Brussels and not the UK†), but – again – fact-based arguments against free mobility on economic or welfare grounds were hard to find. Nevertheless, free mobility within the EU became quickly the scapegoat for the economic and social woes that had distressed the country since the great recession, and perhaps even earlier, such as crime, real wage decline, inequality, unemployment, access to social services, health provision, and benefits and transfers. “Immigration†and everything people associated with it and were encouraged to believe by a relentless campaign of the majority of the tabloid press decisively contributed to the decision that the UK took on June 23, 2016. Immigration and free mobility will likely again be central in the negotiations between the UK and its European partners in developing a model for Brexit that minimises the economic costs fo both the UK and the EU.\",\"PeriodicalId\":134919,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"30 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"26\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900373\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900373","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The recent referendum in the UK on membership of the EU has sent shockwaves across the political establishment not just in the UK itself and throughout Europe, but also around the world. In the runup to the referendum, economists were (perhaps for the first time) united in pointing out that the economic case for Brexit is rather slim, that hardly any well-argued reason could be given by the Brexit camp as to why it may be a good idea to leave the EU, and that the economic consequences could be severe. That lack of economic argument in favour of Brexit, which should have been the key battleground in the run up to the referendum, led the debate to focus on one particular issue, Immigration. Like the free movement of goods, capital, and services, a fundamental pillar of the EU, and a non-negotiable requirement for any new member state, is the free movement of people. It is that particular aspect of EU membership that became the strongest single assertion of the Brexit camp. The inability to control immigration f m within the EU was made a symbol for everything else Brexit stood for (such as the idea of “sovereignty†or the pain of being subjugated to “rules made in Brussels and not the UK†), but – again – fact-based arguments against free mobility on economic or welfare grounds were hard to find. Nevertheless, free mobility within the EU became quickly the scapegoat for the economic and social woes that had distressed the country since the great recession, and perhaps even earlier, such as crime, real wage decline, inequality, unemployment, access to social services, health provision, and benefits and transfers. “Immigration†and everything people associated with it and were encouraged to believe by a relentless campaign of the majority of the tabloid press decisively contributed to the decision that the UK took on June 23, 2016. Immigration and free mobility will likely again be central in the negotiations between the UK and its European partners in developing a model for Brexit that minimises the economic costs fo both the UK and the EU.