Argumentative Exchange in Science: How Social Epistemology Brings Longino back down to Earth

Abstract In her account of scientific objectivity, feminist philosopher of science Helen Longino shows how scientific objectivity is not so much of individual practice, but rather a social commitment practiced by a scientific community, provided by the necessary accommodations for critical discourse. However, is this conception of scientific objectivity truly capable of living up to the social realities of critical discourse and deliberation within a scientific community? Drawing from Dutilh Novaes’ social epistemological account of argumentation, this paper highlights the challenges Longino’s scientific objectivity faces on a prescriptive and descriptive level, specifically in overcoming the various epistemic injustices Longino’s proposed structural accommodations for objectivity are still sensitive to. Dutilh Novaes’ social epistemological model of argumentation illustrates how the realities of critical debate too often don’t consist of true epistemic or knowledge exchange, even though such exchanges are essential to achieve Longino’s primary goal when redefining scientific objectivity: to wield out and address idiosyncratic background assumptions and individual bigotry that possibly influence a researcher’s scientific conduct.