Rabimba Karanjai, Lei Xu, Lin Chen, Fengwei Zhang, Zhimin Gao, W. Shi
{"title":"可信执行环境的区块链应用的经验教训及其对未来研究的影响","authors":"Rabimba Karanjai, Lei Xu, Lin Chen, Fengwei Zhang, Zhimin Gao, W. Shi","doi":"10.1145/3505253.3505259","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Modern computer systems tend to rely on large trusted computing bases (TCBs) for operations. To address the TCB bloating problem, hardware vendors have developed mechanisms to enable or facilitate the creation of a trusted execution environment (TEE) in which critical software applications can execute securely in an isolated environment. Even under the circumstance that a host OS is compromised by an adversary, key security properties such as confidentiality and integrity of the software inside the TEEs can be guaranteed. The promise of integrity and security has driven developers to adopt it for use cases involving access control, PKS, IoT among other things. Among these applications include blockchain-related use cases. The usage of the TEEs doesn’t come without its own implementation challenges and potential pitfalls. In this paper, we examine the assumptions, security models, and operational environments of the proposed TEE use cases of blockchain-based applications. The exercise and analysis help the hardware TEE research community to identify some open challenges and opportunities for research and rethink the design of hardware TEEs in general.","PeriodicalId":342645,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy","volume":"187 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Lessons Learned from Blockchain Applications of Trusted Execution Environments and Implications for Future Research\",\"authors\":\"Rabimba Karanjai, Lei Xu, Lin Chen, Fengwei Zhang, Zhimin Gao, W. Shi\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3505253.3505259\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Modern computer systems tend to rely on large trusted computing bases (TCBs) for operations. To address the TCB bloating problem, hardware vendors have developed mechanisms to enable or facilitate the creation of a trusted execution environment (TEE) in which critical software applications can execute securely in an isolated environment. Even under the circumstance that a host OS is compromised by an adversary, key security properties such as confidentiality and integrity of the software inside the TEEs can be guaranteed. The promise of integrity and security has driven developers to adopt it for use cases involving access control, PKS, IoT among other things. Among these applications include blockchain-related use cases. The usage of the TEEs doesn’t come without its own implementation challenges and potential pitfalls. In this paper, we examine the assumptions, security models, and operational environments of the proposed TEE use cases of blockchain-based applications. The exercise and analysis help the hardware TEE research community to identify some open challenges and opportunities for research and rethink the design of hardware TEEs in general.\",\"PeriodicalId\":342645,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy\",\"volume\":\"187 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3505253.3505259\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3505253.3505259","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Lessons Learned from Blockchain Applications of Trusted Execution Environments and Implications for Future Research
Modern computer systems tend to rely on large trusted computing bases (TCBs) for operations. To address the TCB bloating problem, hardware vendors have developed mechanisms to enable or facilitate the creation of a trusted execution environment (TEE) in which critical software applications can execute securely in an isolated environment. Even under the circumstance that a host OS is compromised by an adversary, key security properties such as confidentiality and integrity of the software inside the TEEs can be guaranteed. The promise of integrity and security has driven developers to adopt it for use cases involving access control, PKS, IoT among other things. Among these applications include blockchain-related use cases. The usage of the TEEs doesn’t come without its own implementation challenges and potential pitfalls. In this paper, we examine the assumptions, security models, and operational environments of the proposed TEE use cases of blockchain-based applications. The exercise and analysis help the hardware TEE research community to identify some open challenges and opportunities for research and rethink the design of hardware TEEs in general.