竞争政策和竞争执行者在欧盟应对金融危机中的作用:将TFEU的国家援助规则应用于银行救助以限制金融部门竞争的扭曲

Jonathan M. DeVito
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引用次数: 4

摘要

世界各国政府对2008-2009年金融危机的反应是,向规模最大、联系最紧密的银行提供大规模救助。在大多数司法管辖区,金融稳定优先于所有其他政策问题,这意味着竞争政策在诉讼过程中被降级为一个遥远的旁观者。然而,欧盟的情况并非如此。在欧盟,竞争政策和竞争执法机构在制定欧洲应对危机的措施方面发挥了主导作用。本文评估了欧盟为防止救助扭曲金融部门竞争而行使其国家援助权力的情况。在此过程中,本文探讨了(a)金融危机期间竞争政策的重要性,以及(b)竞争执法者与银行当局协调以形成有效反应的能力。当立法者评估危机的结果,并考虑可能采取哪些不同的措施来预防或应对未来的危机时,他们应该借鉴欧盟模式中最有效的方面,并将竞争政策和竞争官员纳入未来的危机程序中。
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The Role of Competition Policy and Competition Enforcers in the EU Response to the Financial Crisis: Applying the State Aid Rules of the TFEU to Bank Bailouts in Order to Limit Distortions of Competition in the Financial Sector
Governments throughout the world responded to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 by granting massive bailouts to their largest and most interconnected banks. In most jurisdictions, financial stability took precedence over all other policy concerns, which meant that competition policy was relegated to the position of a distant spectator in the proceedings. This was not the case in the EU, however, where competition policy and competition enforcers played a lead role in shaping the European response to the crisis. This paper evaluates the EU’s exercise of its State aid authority to prevent bailouts from distorting competition in the financial sector. In doing so, this paper explores (a) the importance of competition policy during a financial crisis, and (b) the ability of competition enforcers to coordinate with banking authorities in order to form an effective response. As lawmakers assess the outcomes of the crisis, and consider what might be done differently to prevent or respond to a future crisis, they should draw upon the most effective aspects of the EU model, and incorporate competition policy and competition officials in future crisis proceedings.
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