This chapter sets out the principles and emerging practice governing cartel damages in the EU and UK. It identifies the types of damages available; the issue surrounding causation, pass-on, volume effects, and mitigation; and the methods that have been be used to estimate overcharges, volume effects, and duration of a cartel. A version of the chapter is to appear in Research Handbook on Cartels, Peter Whelan, ed., Edward Elgar.
{"title":"Calculating Cartel Damages","authors":"C. Veljanovski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3908038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3908038","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter sets out the principles and emerging practice governing cartel damages in the EU and UK. It identifies the types of damages available; the issue surrounding causation, pass-on, volume effects, and mitigation; and the methods that have been be used to estimate overcharges, volume effects, and duration of a cartel. A version of the chapter is to appear in Research Handbook on Cartels, Peter Whelan, ed., Edward Elgar.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115444965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An increasing number of studies have suggested the imposition of data access and data sharing obligations for online platforms or gatekeepers. Some of these obligations have been included in the proposed Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, which either presuppose or encourage the creation of repositories of information accessible to qualified actors. In parallel, the European Commission is promoting for strategic economic sectors and domains of public interest the concept of common European data spaces, defined as “large pools of data in these sectors and domains, combined with the technical tools and infrastructures necessary to use and exchange data, as well as appropriate governance mechanisms”. However, we are yet to know the rules, procedures and institutional safeguards applicable to these data sharing mechanisms, which are undoubtedly crucial when it comes to determining their legality under competition law. This chapter sketches the challenges involved in this determination for a wide range of collaborations revolving around data access and data sharing, which we call “data collaboratives”.
{"title":"Data Collaboratives, Competition Law and the Governance of EU Data Spaces","authors":"N. Zingales","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3897051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3897051","url":null,"abstract":"An increasing number of studies have suggested the imposition of data access and data sharing obligations for online platforms or gatekeepers. Some of these obligations have been included in the proposed Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, which either presuppose or encourage the creation of repositories of information accessible to qualified actors. In parallel, the European Commission is promoting for strategic economic sectors and domains of public interest the concept of common European data spaces, defined as “large pools of data in these sectors and domains, combined with the technical tools and infrastructures necessary to use and exchange data, as well as appropriate governance mechanisms”. However, we are yet to know the rules, procedures and institutional safeguards applicable to these data sharing mechanisms, which are undoubtedly crucial when it comes to determining their legality under competition law. This chapter sketches the challenges involved in this determination for a wide range of collaborations revolving around data access and data sharing, which we call “data collaboratives”.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125517744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the effectiveness of the administrative fines imposed by the European Commission on cartels from an economic perspective. It reviews the theory, practice, and evidence of optimal fines and assesses whether the European Commission fines, leniency, and settlement procedures deter and otherwise affect the actions of cartels.
{"title":"The Effectiveness of European Antitrust Fines","authors":"C. Veljanovski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3730361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3730361","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effectiveness of the administrative fines imposed by the European Commission on cartels from an economic perspective. It reviews the theory, practice, and evidence of optimal fines and assesses whether the European Commission fines, leniency, and settlement procedures deter and otherwise affect the actions of cartels.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125819410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Technical standards that are agreed within a Standard Development Organization (SDO) often cover several ‘essential’ patents for the implementation of a standard (i.e., Standard Essential Patents, SEPs). In order to allow for the standard implementation, the SEP holder commits to license its patents to any potential licensee on the basis of Fair and Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) conditions. In view of the recent ruling of the UK Supreme Court in Unwired Planet and the judgement of the German Bundesgerichtshof in Sisvel v. Haier, the paper assumes that the FRAND commitment implies a ‘range’ rather than a ‘single’ royalty rate. On the other hand, a royalty rate ‘beyond the outer boundary of the range’ should be considered ‘unfair’, and thus incompatible with the FRAND commitment. Besides representing a breach of the FRAND commitment, an ‘unfair’ royalty rate might also be considered an abuse of a dominant position by the SEP holder, in breach of Art. 102(a) TFEU. This paper analyses whether, and under what circumstances, Art. 102(a) TFEU can be relied upon by a competition authority in Europe to sanction a case where an ‘unfair’ royalty rate has been set by the SEP holder. To this regard, the paper provides a detailed analysis of the EU Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on Art. 102(a) TFEU. In particular, the latter jurisprudence is relied as a ‘yardstick’ to assess ‘when’ competition policy should sanction a request of unfair royalty rate by the SEP holder, ‘how’ a competition agency should assess the case and, eventually, ‘what’ remedies the competition authority might adopt. Economists have elaborated a number of ‘filters’ to define ‘when’ EU competition policy should sanction unfair pricing cases. In particular, antitrust intervention would be justified only in markets that are characterized by high and stable entry barriers, in which a firm enjoys a super-dominant position. Due to the phenomenon of over-declaration, not every SEP is indeed ‘essential’; the market power of the SEP holder thus requires a case-by-case analysis of the ‘essentiality’ of every SEP. A number of authors have also argued that excessive pricing cases should not be sanctioned in industries characterized by dynamic efficiencies. The paper argues that innovation considerations could be considered as efficiency defences in the context of antitrust investigations, rather than in excluding a priori competition policy enforcement in this field. The paper argues that a competition agency should rely on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on Art. 102(a) TFEU to analyse a case of unfair royalty rate. In particular, United Brands cost/price test is not suitable for assessing an unfair royalty rate requested by the SEP holder, since it is de facto impossible to determine the ‘costs of production’ of individual SEPs. On the other hand, in accordance with the CJEU case law, the competition agency might rely on a number of benchmark metho
{"title":"Unfair Pricing and Standard Essential Patents","authors":"M. Botta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3708003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3708003","url":null,"abstract":"Technical standards that are agreed within a Standard Development Organization (SDO) often cover several ‘essential’ patents for the implementation of a standard (i.e., Standard Essential Patents, SEPs). In order to allow for the standard implementation, the SEP holder commits to license its patents to any potential licensee on the basis of Fair and Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) conditions. In view of the recent ruling of the UK Supreme Court in Unwired Planet and the judgement of the German Bundesgerichtshof in Sisvel v. Haier, the paper assumes that the FRAND commitment implies a ‘range’ rather than a ‘single’ royalty rate. On the other hand, a royalty rate ‘beyond the outer boundary of the range’ should be considered ‘unfair’, and thus incompatible with the FRAND commitment. Besides representing a breach of the FRAND commitment, an ‘unfair’ royalty rate might also be considered an abuse of a dominant position by the SEP holder, in breach of Art. 102(a) TFEU. This paper analyses whether, and under what circumstances, Art. 102(a) TFEU can be relied upon by a competition authority in Europe to sanction a case where an ‘unfair’ royalty rate has been set by the SEP holder. To this regard, the paper provides a detailed analysis of the EU Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on Art. 102(a) TFEU. In particular, the latter jurisprudence is relied as a ‘yardstick’ to assess ‘when’ competition policy should sanction a request of unfair royalty rate by the SEP holder, ‘how’ a competition agency should assess the case and, eventually, ‘what’ remedies the competition authority might adopt. \u0000 \u0000Economists have elaborated a number of ‘filters’ to define ‘when’ EU competition policy should sanction unfair pricing cases. In particular, antitrust intervention would be justified only in markets that are characterized by high and stable entry barriers, in which a firm enjoys a super-dominant position. Due to the phenomenon of over-declaration, not every SEP is indeed ‘essential’; the market power of the SEP holder thus requires a case-by-case analysis of the ‘essentiality’ of every SEP. A number of authors have also argued that excessive pricing cases should not be sanctioned in industries characterized by dynamic efficiencies. The paper argues that innovation considerations could be considered as efficiency defences in the context of antitrust investigations, rather than in excluding a priori competition policy enforcement in this field. \u0000 \u0000The paper argues that a competition agency should rely on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on Art. 102(a) TFEU to analyse a case of unfair royalty rate. In particular, United Brands cost/price test is not suitable for assessing an unfair royalty rate requested by the SEP holder, since it is de facto impossible to determine the ‘costs of production’ of individual SEPs. On the other hand, in accordance with the CJEU case law, the competition agency might rely on a number of benchmark metho","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131967654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) proposals to lower the standard of review of certain antitrust decisions in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) from a merits appeal to judicial review principles or some other limited basis, while retaining the CAT’s ‘full jurisdiction’ over fines, and to amend the CAT’s rules of procedure to restrict the admissibility of new evidence on appeal and the use of oral testimony. The argument developed in this article is that such proposals are: (i) in conflict with the constitutional principle of the rule of law; (ii) incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA98); (iii) a step back even from the often criticized standard of review applied by the Union Courts in respect of European Commission’s decisions; (iv) inappropriate as a matter of policy. If the current regime needs improving to reduce the cost and length of the proceedings, then three options should be considered: (i) moving from a merits appeal to a merits review (Option 1); (ii) strengthening the independence of the decision-making panel within the CMA (Option 2), while lowering the standard of review to judicial review principles; (iii) establishing a prosecutorial model (Option 3). Option 3 is the most radical but should be given serious consideration as it is likely to be the best suited to achieving the policy objective of reducing the cost and length of competition proceedings while at the same time retaining rigorous scrutiny of the facts and economic evidence, which is key to ensuring not only the fairness, and therefore the legitimacy, of the system, but also its effectiveness.
{"title":"A Reform Too Few or a Reform Too Many: Judicial Review, Appeals or a Prosecutorial System under the UK Competition Act 1998?","authors":"Renato Nazzini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3544305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3544305","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article discusses the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) proposals to lower the standard of review of certain antitrust decisions in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) from a merits appeal to judicial review principles or some other limited basis, while retaining the CAT’s ‘full jurisdiction’ over fines, and to amend the CAT’s rules of procedure to restrict the admissibility of new evidence on appeal and the use of oral testimony. The argument developed in this article is that such proposals are: (i) in conflict with the constitutional principle of the rule of law; (ii) incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA98); (iii) a step back even from the often criticized standard of review applied by the Union Courts in respect of European Commission’s decisions; (iv) inappropriate as a matter of policy. If the current regime needs improving to reduce the cost and length of the proceedings, then three options should be considered: (i) moving from a merits appeal to a merits review (Option 1); (ii) strengthening the independence of the decision-making panel within the CMA (Option 2), while lowering the standard of review to judicial review principles; (iii) establishing a prosecutorial model (Option 3). Option 3 is the most radical but should be given serious consideration as it is likely to be the best suited to achieving the policy objective of reducing the cost and length of competition proceedings while at the same time retaining rigorous scrutiny of the facts and economic evidence, which is key to ensuring not only the fairness, and therefore the legitimacy, of the system, but also its effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134604974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tad Lipsky, Joshua D. Wright, D. Ginsburg, John M. Yun
This comment is submitted by the Global Antitrust Institute (GAI) at the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University to the Swedish Competition Authority regarding its proposed market study of digital platforms. The GAI Competition Advocacy Program provides a wide range of recommendations to facilitate adoption of economically sound competition policies.
{"title":"Swedish Competition Authority's Proposed Market Study of Digital Platforms, Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University","authors":"Tad Lipsky, Joshua D. Wright, D. Ginsburg, John M. Yun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3496810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3496810","url":null,"abstract":"This comment is submitted by the Global Antitrust Institute (GAI) at the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University to the Swedish Competition Authority regarding its proposed market study of digital platforms. The GAI Competition Advocacy Program provides a wide range of recommendations to facilitate adoption of economically sound competition policies.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"441 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133625175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Digitization, legal tech and legal design thinking are increasingly shaping the daily workings of legal departments. The following article examines the extent to which related methods - such as quantitative cartel screening tools - can be used to detect antitrust infringements of suppliers.
{"title":"Screening Methods for the Detection of Antitrust Infringements","authors":"H. Beth, Thilo Reimers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3501700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501700","url":null,"abstract":"Digitization, legal tech and legal design thinking are increasingly shaping the daily workings of legal departments. The following article examines the extent to which related methods - such as quantitative cartel screening tools - can be used to detect antitrust infringements of suppliers.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130034317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We build a model where firm size is a source of labor market power. The key mechanism is that a granular employer can eliminate its own vacancies from a worker's outside option in the wage bargain. Hence, a granular employer does not compete with itself. We show how wages depend on employment concentration and then use the model to quantify the effects of granular market power. In Austrian micro-data, we find that granular market power depresses wages by about ten percent and can explain 40 percent of the observed decline in the labor share from 1997 to 2015. Mergers decrease competition for workers and reduce wages even at non-merging firms.
{"title":"Granular Search, Market Structure, and Wages","authors":"Gregor Jarosch, J. Nimczik, Isaac Sorkin","doi":"10.3386/w26239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26239","url":null,"abstract":"We build a model where firm size is a source of labor market power. The key mechanism is that a granular employer can eliminate its own vacancies from a worker's outside option in the wage bargain. Hence, a granular employer does not compete with itself. We show how wages depend on employment concentration and then use the model to quantify the effects of granular market power. In Austrian micro-data, we find that granular market power depresses wages by about ten percent and can explain 40 percent of the observed decline in the labor share from 1997 to 2015. Mergers decrease competition for workers and reduce wages even at non-merging firms.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121246471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A substantial number of cartels in the European Union are detected and enforced by the national competition authorities (NCAs). The effectiveness of the domestic enforcement has been subject to extensive review and debates, which have recently culminated and resulted in the proposal for the ECN Directive. The current discussions are mostly limited to the number of enforcement activities, the quantity of imposed fines and their height and deterrence. An empirical assessment of the court procedures in which those fines were challenged and the consequences thereof received minimal attention, despite its importance. The Dutch example, more in particular the difference between the fines as issued by the NCA and those remaining after court review, shows that the mere reference to the number of cases sanctioned paints a distorted picture and an analysis of the rates of litigation and successful litigation is indispensable for veraciously assessing the NCA’s effectiveness. In light thereof, this article analyses the frequency of (successful) litigation and the reasons for annulments in cases of cartel fines in ten Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Public policy makers, such as the European Commission, could benefit from this data gathered in order to analyse the effectiveness of the NCAs. Moreover, the analysis is valuable for future research, since the depiction of the trends and differences can form the basis for further research to explain the percentages, trends and developments – as the author is doing for the Netherlands.
{"title":"Effective Public Enforcement of Cartels: Rates of Challenged and Annulled Cartel Fines in Ten European Member States","authors":"A. Outhuijse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3401260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3401260","url":null,"abstract":"A substantial number of cartels in the European Union are detected and enforced by the national competition authorities (NCAs). The effectiveness of the domestic enforcement has been subject to extensive review and debates, which have recently culminated and resulted in the proposal for the ECN Directive. The current discussions are mostly limited to the number of enforcement activities, the quantity of imposed fines and their height and deterrence. An empirical assessment of the court procedures in which those fines were challenged and the consequences thereof received minimal attention, despite its importance. The Dutch example, more in particular the difference between the fines as issued by the NCA and those remaining after court review, shows that the mere reference to the number of cases sanctioned paints a distorted picture and an analysis of the rates of litigation and successful litigation is indispensable for veraciously assessing the NCA’s effectiveness. In light thereof, this article analyses the frequency of (successful) litigation and the reasons for annulments in cases of cartel fines in ten Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Public policy makers, such as the European Commission, could benefit from this data gathered in order to analyse the effectiveness of the NCAs. Moreover, the analysis is valuable for future research, since the depiction of the trends and differences can form the basis for further research to explain the percentages, trends and developments – as the author is doing for the Netherlands.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128240818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-09DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-22753-1_18
Sergio Gilotta
{"title":"The Implementation of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive in Italy: An Overview with a Critical Assessment of Dissenting Shareholders’ Appraisal","authors":"Sergio Gilotta","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-22753-1_18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22753-1_18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127786589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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