主权游戏的未来

Ryan D. Griffiths
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章最后对主权博弈的未来进行了理论分析和规范分析。它强调了过去国际承认制度的几种配置,并确定了三种潜在的未来配置,重点是补救权利、基本权利和国家同意。本章还讨论了每种配置的比较静态数据,即预期的分裂频率,冲突,以及新国家作为该制度的结果的适应性。然后,这一章将转向如何改进游戏的更规范的分析。它谨慎地论证了一个强调以共识为基础的民主化分裂的政权的优点,在这个政权中,独立运动有正式的制度渠道,但政治退出的条件却很难达到。主权博弈的最终好处是,国家内部和国家之间的冲突都将减少。最后,本章详细说明了对这项研究可能提出的批评,指出该建议没有提及补救权利的重要性,并认为实施起来相当困难。
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The Future of the Sovereignty Game
This chapter concludes with a theoretical and prescriptive analysis of the future of the sovereignty game. It highlights several past configurations of the international recognition regime, and identifies three potential future configurations that focus on remedial rights, primary rights, and state consent. The chapter also discusses the comparative statics of each configuration — that is, the expected frequency of secession, conflict, and the fitness of new states as a result of the regime. The chapter then shifts to a more prescriptive analysis of how the game might be improved. It argues, with caution, for the merits of a regime that emphasizes consent-based democratized secession, in which independence movements have formal institutional access but where the conditions for political exit are nevertheless hard to reach. The resulting benefits for the sovereignty game are that conflict would be reduced both within and between states. Ultimately, the chapter details the potential critiques of the study, noting that the proposal says nothing about the importance of a remedial right and maintained that it is quite difficult to implement.
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The Future of the Sovereignty Game A Theory of Secessionist Strategy and Tactical Variation The Causes and Consequences of Bad Strategy and Poor Tactics States, Secessionist Movements, and the International Recognition Regime New Caledonia
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