‘Voting Behavior’ to Make Better Choice With Reference to Delhi NCR

Existing political economy models have tended to examine how more information influences either electoral accountability or on turnout. Our evidence and theoretical reasoning, however, suggests that information should influence both margins of voter behavior. One contribution of this paper is to provide a model which identifies the conditions under which information increases electoral accountability when turnout is endogenous. We consider an economic environment in which a sub-population of ethical voters face a cost of voting but may still choose to vote in order to maximize group welfare. We assume that these voters favor politicians whom they expect to perform better, where performance is measured along the lines framed by the report cards. More precise information about incumbent performance increases the expected benefits from voting for the preferred candidate and, therefore, typically increases turnout and reduces vote buying. More precise performance and qualification signals also boost the vote share of better performing incumbents under reasonable conditions. Finally, how turnout varies with incumbent performance depends on voters’ priors.