{"title":"第二个风","authors":"Dick Francis","doi":"10.5040/9780755623051.ch-011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"at its headquarters in New York. Although many were hoping for a strong result, the Second Review Conference faced the same problem that had contributed to the failure of the First Review Conference, in 2006, namely how to make sense of a mandate that required it to review progress made in PoA implementation when there was no mechanism to do so. This chapter explains how the Second Review Conference managed to achieve a result that holds out the promise of a strengthened PoA despite the initial uncertainty surrounding its mandate. Drawing on relevant UN documents and the author's own observations of the meeting and its preparatory phase, the chapter examines the principal features of the Review Conference process and outcome. With respect to process, the Second Review Conference, including its preparatory phase, was characterized by incremental, visible progress towards a final, consensual outcome. It avoided many of the problems that had plagued the First Review Conference, largely through the use of a working method that contributed to the success of UN small arms meetings after 2006. Among other things, this translated into the early designation of the Conference president, Ambassador U. Joy Ogwu of Nigeria, and the optimal use of scarce meeting time. Another important factor in the Review Conference success was the resolution of the uncertainty surrounding its mandate at an early stage. Draft outcome documents were prepared and discussed during the months preceding the Conference. By the time the meeting started, states seemed comfortable with an outcome that, while forward-looking, was squarely rooted in the implementation of norms laid out in the PoA and the related International Tracing Instrument (ITI). Equally important, at the Second Review Conference UN member states showed a willingness to compromise that they had often lacked at its 2006 predecessor. At the end of the Second Review Conference, UN member states adopted, by consensus, a substantive outcome in which they committed themselves to a series of measures designed to bolster implementation of the PoA and the ITI during the period leading","PeriodicalId":310333,"journal":{"name":"Breathe Easy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Second Wind\",\"authors\":\"Dick Francis\",\"doi\":\"10.5040/9780755623051.ch-011\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"at its headquarters in New York. Although many were hoping for a strong result, the Second Review Conference faced the same problem that had contributed to the failure of the First Review Conference, in 2006, namely how to make sense of a mandate that required it to review progress made in PoA implementation when there was no mechanism to do so. This chapter explains how the Second Review Conference managed to achieve a result that holds out the promise of a strengthened PoA despite the initial uncertainty surrounding its mandate. Drawing on relevant UN documents and the author's own observations of the meeting and its preparatory phase, the chapter examines the principal features of the Review Conference process and outcome. With respect to process, the Second Review Conference, including its preparatory phase, was characterized by incremental, visible progress towards a final, consensual outcome. It avoided many of the problems that had plagued the First Review Conference, largely through the use of a working method that contributed to the success of UN small arms meetings after 2006. Among other things, this translated into the early designation of the Conference president, Ambassador U. Joy Ogwu of Nigeria, and the optimal use of scarce meeting time. Another important factor in the Review Conference success was the resolution of the uncertainty surrounding its mandate at an early stage. Draft outcome documents were prepared and discussed during the months preceding the Conference. By the time the meeting started, states seemed comfortable with an outcome that, while forward-looking, was squarely rooted in the implementation of norms laid out in the PoA and the related International Tracing Instrument (ITI). Equally important, at the Second Review Conference UN member states showed a willingness to compromise that they had often lacked at its 2006 predecessor. At the end of the Second Review Conference, UN member states adopted, by consensus, a substantive outcome in which they committed themselves to a series of measures designed to bolster implementation of the PoA and the ITI during the period leading\",\"PeriodicalId\":310333,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Breathe Easy\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-06-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Breathe Easy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755623051.ch-011\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Breathe Easy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755623051.ch-011","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
at its headquarters in New York. Although many were hoping for a strong result, the Second Review Conference faced the same problem that had contributed to the failure of the First Review Conference, in 2006, namely how to make sense of a mandate that required it to review progress made in PoA implementation when there was no mechanism to do so. This chapter explains how the Second Review Conference managed to achieve a result that holds out the promise of a strengthened PoA despite the initial uncertainty surrounding its mandate. Drawing on relevant UN documents and the author's own observations of the meeting and its preparatory phase, the chapter examines the principal features of the Review Conference process and outcome. With respect to process, the Second Review Conference, including its preparatory phase, was characterized by incremental, visible progress towards a final, consensual outcome. It avoided many of the problems that had plagued the First Review Conference, largely through the use of a working method that contributed to the success of UN small arms meetings after 2006. Among other things, this translated into the early designation of the Conference president, Ambassador U. Joy Ogwu of Nigeria, and the optimal use of scarce meeting time. Another important factor in the Review Conference success was the resolution of the uncertainty surrounding its mandate at an early stage. Draft outcome documents were prepared and discussed during the months preceding the Conference. By the time the meeting started, states seemed comfortable with an outcome that, while forward-looking, was squarely rooted in the implementation of norms laid out in the PoA and the related International Tracing Instrument (ITI). Equally important, at the Second Review Conference UN member states showed a willingness to compromise that they had often lacked at its 2006 predecessor. At the end of the Second Review Conference, UN member states adopted, by consensus, a substantive outcome in which they committed themselves to a series of measures designed to bolster implementation of the PoA and the ITI during the period leading